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Abstract
Job-training programmes with low completion rates: The case of Projoven-Peru**
Projoven is an ongoing Peruvian youth job-training programme started in 1996
and conducted in successive waves or ‘public calls’. The programme has two
phases of instruction: i) three months of classroom training, followed by ii) three
months of on-the-job training internship. From 1997 to 2007, less than 60% of
registrants completed both phases. This paper estimates the effectiveness of
Projoven’s sixth Public Call, in terms of overall and formal employment and
wage outcomes, while accounting for the presence of trainees with partial
instruction. Four groups are compared pairwise: the control group, the dropout
group with only classroom training, the dropout group with classroom training
and internship placement, and the group completing the full programme. Our
estimations account for selection effects and the potential endogeneity of training
completion. We find that in terms of overall and formal employment, the
programme yields returns only in the short run and conditioned on internship
completion. The programme seems to increase trainee wages, but these effects
diminish over time. Projoven is relatively more effective for individuals with no
work experience prior to enrolment.
JEL classification: H43, I38, O15.
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1. Introduction 
 
During the 1980s, several stylized facts characterized the economies of Latin 
America: low rates of economic growth (lower than population growth), high 
external debt, constricted internal consumption and savings, high inflation, 
devaluation of local currencies, and expansion of the informal sector. As a 
consequence, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, many countries in the region 
implemented an accelerated process of structural reform, in accordance with the 
Washington Consensus. Some of the most dramatic reforms were carried out in 
labour markets, in order to increase their flexibility. 1 
 
In a post-structural–reform scenario, Latin American countries faced serious 
challenges to improving employment prospects for younger workers, 
particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds. Beginning in the 1990s, by 
teaching participants labour skills and by providing work experience, youth job-
training programmes (YJTP) attempted to mitigate the effects of structural 
reforms on economically disadvantaged youth. Such youth training programmes 
have been carried out throughout Latin America. 
  
YJTPs have remained in operation in the region. They have endured as a 
response to the persistent income inequality and falling real earnings among 
young, low-skilled workers. According to the Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLAC, 2008), Latin American youth labour market participation rose 
from 59.4% to 62.8% between 1990 and 2006. During this period the average 
youth unemployment rate hovered around 13%, and among low-income 
households, 24%. Further, young workers were employed mostly in the informal 
sector, and social security coverage fell from 61% to 53%. Youths represent 20% 
of the total population of Latin America as a whole. Since these workers are also 
bread-winners in their households, the effectiveness of YJTPs as policy 
intervention is critical. 
 
In contrast with developed countries, where YJTPs yield modest, if any, effects 
on youth employment prospects (Heckman et al., 1999), training programmes are 
regarded as effective policy interventions in Latin America. Betcherman et al. 
(2004) and Ibarrarán and Rosas (2008) review numerous evaluation studies in the 
region and find that YJTPs generate positive and statistically significant effects 
on the employment prospects and earnings of the participants, particularly 
women. A distinctive feature that these authors point out is that most Latin 
American training programmes share a common two-step structure: i) classroom 
training, followed by ii) on-the-job training. 
                                                 
1 See: Tokman and Martínez (1999); Egger and García (2000); IADB (2001); Saavedra (2003); and 
Chacaltana (2006). 
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While training programmes are regarded as effective, they suffer from 
substantial dropout rates. In Peru, only 60% of participants complete the 
training; this rate ranges from 51% in Uruguay, to 74% in Chile, 77% in Panama, 
and 60% in the Dominican Republic. The dropout phenomenon has been 
neglected in most YJTP evaluation. Estimating treatment effects which account 
for trainees with partial instruction could yield a different perspective on YJTP 
effectiveness. Amalgamating completers and non-completers may confound 
differing effects. On the one hand, dropping out might imply not obtaining a 
certificate, which could cast the trainee negatively to potential employers. In such 
case, training participation cannot be regarded as beneficial. On the other hand, 
there are cases where dropping out is justified by the sudden emergence of 
appropriate job opportunities. Thus, there is the potential to erroneously 
attribute some outcomes to the programme. The theoretical relationship between 
non-completion of YJTPs and trainee labour market outcomes remains 
ambiguous and its relevance is therefore an empirical question. This paper aims 
to contribute to the evaluation literature by shedding light on the effectiveness of 
YJTPs in the presence of dropouts with partial treatment; we estimate the effects 
of Projoven-Peru (Projoven) on trainee labour market outcomes. 
 
Projoven is an ongoing youth job-training programme initiated in 1996 and 
conducted at least once a year in successive waves or ‗public calls‘. Projoven is 
run by the Peruvian Ministry of Labour. The official goal of the programme is to 
facilitate the insertion of economically disadvantaged youth (16–24 years old) 
into the formal labour market by funding basic training in low-skilled 
occupations. The programme has two phases of instruction: i) three months of 
classroom training, followed by ii) three months of on-the-job training 
internship. Projoven finances training institutions (so-called ECAPs) to train 
participants at their own schools and to subsequently place them in on-the-job 
training internships. 
 
This programme makes for an interesting case study. Projoven is a YJTP similar 
in design to others in Latin America and it has dropout rates similar to others in 
the region. A particular feature of Projoven, which distinguishes it from other 
youth programmes, is that trainees are paid (by the training firm) a minimum 
wage during the on-the-job-training internship. In our estimations, we use the 
Projoven sixth Public Call because availability of data from other Public Calls is 
limited. Existing studies evaluating Projoven‘s impact have been conducted 
and/or sponsored by the programme operator or by former employees of 
Projoven. The data set for the sixth Public call is the most complete one available. 
The Projoven sixth Public Call provides a unique data set that comprises 
measures of completion by trainees of the two phases of the programme as well 
as administrative records about the training providers. This data set comprises a 
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baseline survey and three follow-up interviews: at six, twelve and eighteen 
months post-programme.2 
 
We estimate the effectiveness of Projoven‘s sixth Public Call, in terms of overall 
and formal employment and wages, controlling for the presence of trainees with 
partial instruction. Four groups are compared pairwise: i) the control group with 
no treatment [G1], ii) the dropout group with only classroom training and no 
internship placement [G2], iii) the dropout group with classroom training and 
internship placement [G3], and iv) the treatment group with full treatment 
(classroom training and internship) [G4]. Our estimations account also for the 
potential endogeneity of completion, sample selection, and unobserved 
heterogeneity. As we observe evidence of a pre-training earnings dip, which 
could bias the treatment effect estimates (Heckman and Smith, 1999), we create a 
new control group that is a subsample of the individuals in the official control 
group. This new control group is built by using propensity score matching with 
replacement. The rationale is to create a more comparable control group to 
identify Projoven treatment effects. We check how sensitive our estimates are 
under the presence of unobservables, calculating the Rosenbaum (1995) bounds. 
Additionally, we allow the treatment effect to vary over time and with respect to 
particular individual characteristics (e.g., gender, working experience prior to 
training, and per-capita household income). 
 
The effects of the Projoven sixth Public Call are assessed in three ways. First, to 
estimate the effects of Projoven sixth Public Call participation, we compare the 
labour market outcomes of [G2], [G3], and [G4] with [G1]. Secondly, for those 
groups that complete classroom training, we estimate the effects of Projoven 
sixth Public Call internship placement. These estimations are based on pairwise 
comparison of the labour market outcomes of [G3] and [G4] with [G2]. Thirdly, 
for the groups placed in internships, the effects of Projoven sixth Public Call 
internship completion are estimated. We compare the labour market outcomes of 
[G4] with [G3]. 
 
Overall employment likelihood is modelled using fixed-effects estimators. In the 
case of the effect of the programme on formal employment and wages, a sample 
selection correction is added as suggested by Wooldridge (1995). We also use an 
additional specification to allow for the presence of potential endogeneity of 
internship placement and completion; in this case, a two-stage least squares 
approach with sample selection correction (Semykina and Wooldridge, 2006) is 
applied. 
 
                                                 
2
 The periods post-programme refer to the calendar months after November 2000, when Projoven 
sixth Public Call training is expected to be completed at last. 
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Our findings suggest that with respect to overall employment, Projoven yields 
limited returns. Programme effects diminish significantly over time and are 
conditioned on completion. Only individuals who complete the treatment [G4] 
experience positive and statistically significant returns, six months post-training, 
in comparison to non-participants [G1] and in comparison to dropouts [G3]. The 
effects of the programme are greater, and permanent, for those individuals with 
no work experience prior to training. Regarding formal employment, we find no 
evidence of statistically significant effects on trainees compared to non-
participants. The effects of Projoven on formal employment are positive only 
when the training is completed [G4] and compared to dropouts [G3]. The effects 
on formal employment diminish over time but not significantly. These results 
hold even when training completion is considered to be endogenously 
determined. 
 
With respect to monthly wages, the programme generates positive and 
significant returns for those trainees who at least achieved placement in an 
internship ([G3] and [G4]) in comparison to non-participants [G1]. Additionally, 
completing the two phases of instruction [G4] is rewarded more than dropping 
out [G3]. Compared to the non participants [G1], the effects of Projoven 
participation are persistent. They diminish over time but not significantly. In the 
case of internship completion, the effects are not persistent and diminish 
significantly over time. These results hold even when training completion is 
considered to be endogenously determined. In addition, the returns of the 
programme, in terms of monthly wages, are greater and persistent for 
individuals with no work experience and those in the lowest household income 
per-capita quartile. 
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some 
background and the programme description. Section 3 presents a review of 
youth job-training programme evaluations, including Projoven. A description of 
the Projoven sixth Public Call data set and the way we address issues posed by 
the non-experimental design and the observed pre-treatment earnings dip is 
presented in Section 4. The empirical framework used to evaluate Projoven‘s 
effects is set out in Section 5. Section 6 presents the results of our estimations. 
Finally, Section 7 presents our conclusions. 
 
 
2. Background and Projoven-Peru description 
 
Projoven has trained more than 60,000 individuals in 15 Public Calls in 13 
Peruvian cities from 1996 to 2007. A total of 3.6 million youth within the age 
bracket of 15–24 years (22% of the Peruvian population) entered the workforce in 
this period. The programme attempted to mitigate the effects of the structural 
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reforms on economically disadvantaged youngsters. The rationale was to 
improve the employment prospects of this demographic group to keep them out 
of drugs and criminal activities. 
 
Despite the improvements in educational attainment, young cohorts traditionally 
exhibit higher unemployment rates than adults. During the period 1997–2007, 
the youth unemployment rate was stable at around 14%, almost triple the 
corresponding rate for adults. The youth participation rate was stable at around 
55%, a 20% lower participation rate compared to adults. It is not surprising that 
youth have lower participation rates than adults since many are still in the 
process of acquiring basic human capital (through schooling). However, the 
proportion of youth neither working nor studying was on the increase in urban 
Peru during the period 1997–2007, whereas the proportion of youth engaged 
exclusively in study was slowly declining, from 32% to 29% over this period. 
 
Young Peruvians may work, rather than staying in school, to help their 
households to deal with economic uncertainty. Unfortunately, youth work under 
precarious conditions; while the number of hours worked per week held at close 
to 41 hours, on average, during the period 1997–2007, the average real youth 
wage declined steeply (down 26% over the period). Additionally, 7 out of 10 
worked in the informal labour market, with no social security coverage. 
 
In this context, vocational training seems a suitable option for improving the 
employment prospects of economically disadvantaged youth. With the technical 
assistance of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and with a loan from 
the Inter-American Development Bank, Projoven began its operations in 1996 
under the umbrella of the labour market policies of the Peruvian Ministry of 
Labour. Originally the programme was meant to be nationwide. However, 
budgetary constraints limited programme operations to a smaller target area. 
 
Projoven‘s training courses are based on two main phases of instruction: 
classroom training and on-the-job-training internship. Preceding its training 
activities, the programme encompasses three preparatory phases: course 
selection, targeting, and (self) selection of participants and ECAP creaming. 
ECAP creaming refers to the process by which Projoven assigns trainees to 
courses and ECAPs decide upon assignments when vacancies are limited. 
 
The course selection process begins when Projoven launches a call for training 
providers. Institutions interested in participating in the programme must register 
in the database of training providers called RECAP (Registro de Entidades de 
Capacitación). To be registered at RECAP, potential ECAPs must have a valid 
license from the Ministry of Education, possess proper facilities for teaching, and 
have a track record in vocational training. The ECAPs registered at RECAP are 
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invited to present course proposals. The courses must be at a low skill level, 
terminal (training should be sufficient to get a job – not complementing other 
type of training/education), and most importantly labour-demand oriented 
(there should be firms requiring workers with the training). The courses should 
be designed for no more than 15-25 students per classroom, last between 200 and 
300 hours with four to five contact hours per day spread over four or five days 
per week over 3 months. Proposals are selected based on a grading system. The 
most valued criteria for course selection is having the least unit cost per student 
and the commitment of the ECAP to place at least 60% of the trainees in 
internships. 
 
Targeting and self-selection follows. Potential enrolees are targeted based on a 
poverty map. Projoven‘s branch offices in the selected cities conduct campaigns 
to recruit from the targeted population. The target group consists of youths 
between the ages of 16 and 24, in poverty status, and with low educational 
attainment. The programme operator usually places newspaper ads and 
distributes flyers in strategically selected locations, and invites potential 
participants and their parents to information meetings. 
 
As programme participation is voluntary, participants self-select. Applicants 
who fulfil the requirements of age, poverty status, and low educational 
attainment are called back for a detailed evaluation of their eligibility. Potential 
trainees must fill in a socio-economic evaluation form (the FSEE), which collects 
information about educational attainment, job training experience, labour status, 
family composition, and living space. Based on this information, Projoven 
calculates a poverty score. Only participants above a certain poverty threshold 
are accredited.3 
 
Finally, the ECAPs creaming process takes place. Accredited youths attend a 
meeting where they are informed about the available courses. The advantage of 
matching the courses closely with their skills is pointed out. Next, the potential 
participants take a vocational test and choose three course options. The test 
assesses the capacity of the applicant to execute simple arithmetic operations. 
The rationale for the test is to ascertain that potential trainees match the 
prerequisites of particular courses. For the most requested courses, Projoven 
sends up to three potential trainees for every vacancy available in each ECAP, 
based on trainee preferences and the results of the vocational test. Afterwards, 
the ECAP selects applicants based on interviews. No additional tests are allowed. 
Trainees not given their first option are reallocated according to their preferences 
in less sought-after courses. 
                                                 
3 In order to be accredited, participants should have more than 11 points in their poverty score. 
The poverty score is based on a number of proxies for poverty status, but excludes income. Table 
A1 of the appendix explains the detailed composition of the poverty score index. 
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Actual training begins after these preparatory phases. The three-month 
classroom training phase consists of training courses in standard settings in the 
form of classes and workshops. Projoven assumes tuition costs and pays the 
trainees stipends to cover transportation and food expenses. This amount can be 
marginally higher if the participant is a woman with children, in order to 
encourage her participation. Participants are also covered by basic health 
insurance financed by the programme operator during the instruction period. 
 
The final phase of the programme is a three-month, on-the-job training 
internship. All participants who complete the classroom training, with 
attendance being the only requirement, are entitled in principle to start the on-
the-job training phase. Almost all trainees complete the classroom training (98%); 
however, the ECAPs fail to place around 20% of the trainees in internships. 
During the internship, the trainees should be under the supervision of a tutor. 
The assigned internship must consist of activities that complement the training 
received during classroom instruction. The programme operator supervises the 
development of this phase by interviewing the beneficiaries and participating-
firm managers. The ECAPs are responsible for the compatibility of course 
content with the internship. 
 
 
3. YJTP evaluation 
 
The objective of impact evaluation is to determine whether a social programme 
yields the expected outcomes on the treated population, and whether these 
outcomes are attributable to the programme (Heckman and Smith, 1997). Of 
particular interest is whether programme participants are better off than they 
would have been in the absence of the programme. There emerges the 
fundamental evaluation problem that no individual can be observed 
simultaneously in two mutually exclusive states, factual and counterfactual. One 
way to circumvent this problem is to create a control group to function as a 
substitute for the counterfactual. A control group can be created using either an 
experimental or a non-experimental design. 
 
A purely experimental design is based on random assignment of the eligible 
population—in practice a sample thereof—into beneficiaries of the programme, 
the treatment group, and non-beneficiaries of the programme, the control group. 
Thus, the treatment effect is the average difference in the outcomes of the two 
groups, as treatment assignment is statistically independent of the outcomes. In a 
non-experimental design, the treatment is assigned in a non-random way. 
Individuals as similar as possible in observable covariates to the treated 
individuals are selected and function as control units. Often in practice, this 
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control group is constructed only after the policy intervention; this is the design 
chosen by the Projoven programme operator for its own impact assessment. 
 
The consistency of estimators based on non-experimental designs, in comparison 
with experimental ones, has been widely discussed. On the one hand, LaLonde 
(1986) points out that only experimental evaluations yield consistent average 
treatment effect (ATE) estimators, and demonstrates that estimators using a non-
experimental control group differ from those using experimental data. On the 
other hand, Heckman and Hotz (1989) and Dehejia and Wahba (1999) show how 
this LaLonde argument can break down if there are systematic differences 
between the treatment and control groups in observed as well as unobserved 
characteristics. Once Dehejia and Wahba (1999) control for systematic differences 
between non-experimental treatment and control groups (using LaLonde‘s 
approach to select the same controls), the ATE estimators are close to those 
obtained with experimental data. 
 
One major concern is that differences between treatment and control groups in 
non-experimental designs remain unobserved or are due to self-selection into 
treatment. Individual decisions to comply with treatment could be related to its 
benefits. The literature on policy evaluation offers diverse methods to 
circumvent the limitations of non-experimental design. 4  Despite the 
development of sophisticated evaluation methods in a large number of studies, 
uncertainty persists about which kind of training works best, the appropriate 
doses of training, the individual characteristics most important for training 
effectiveness, and aggregate (general equilibrium) programme effects 
(Friedlander et al., 1997). 
 
Friedlander et al. (1997) review prior evidence on the effects of YJTPs. These 
authors conclude that job-training programmes generally yield modest positive 
effects on employment and earnings for adult men and women, but fail to 
produce positive effects for youth. Heckman et al. (1999) compare YJTPs in the 
U.S. and in Europe; they find that in the U.S., YJTPs have no effect on earnings of 
economically disadvantaged youth and only a modest effect on employment 
rates. In Europe, results are similar with respect to earnings but more positive 
regarding employment levels. American studies use experimental designs more 
commonly than European studies. Political constraints and universal entitlement 
to social programmes make non-experimental designs the rule in Europe. 
 
In the Latin American context, the evaluation of YJTPs leads to quite different 
conclusions compared with American and European programmes. YJTPs in 
                                                 
4 For a review on methodologies used to evaluate policy interventions with non-experimental 
data see Heckman and Robb (1989); Friedlander and Robins (1995); Heckman and Smith (1997); 
and Heckman and Hotz (1989). 
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Latin America are found to combine positive and statistically significant effects 
on earnings with small but significant effects on the probability of employment, 
particularly for women (Betcherman et al., 2004; Ibarrarán and Rosas, 2008). 
These results are not due to the fact that these studies are based on non-
experimental evaluations. Two studies that use experimental data for Dominican 
Republic (Card et al., 2007) and Colombia (Attanasio et al., 2008) also find 
positive returns for YJTP participants‘ employment likelihood and earnings. 
 
An explanation for the higher impact of YJTPs on earnings in Latin America than 
in Europe and the U.S. may be found in the availability of alternative treatments. 
Should substitutes for the training programme be available (social assistance, 
counselling, etc.), then the experimental effect of the programme can be zero or 
negative, even if the effect of training relative to no training at all is large and 
positive (Heckman et al., 2000). 
 
In most studies (Americans, Europeans or Latin Americans) the presence of 
trainees with only partial instruction has been neglected. Ignoring dropout could 
yield misleading conclusions about the effectiveness of training programs. For 
instance, if dropping out results from a job offer that is not attributable to the 
programme, we could erroneously ascribe to the programme a positive impact. If 
the dropouts have negative labour market outcomes, this may jeopardize the 
effectiveness of the whole programme.  
 
Projoven treatment effect evaluations 
 
Since its initiation, Projoven has used a non-experimental impact evaluation 
component. This evaluation component uses a selection of trainees and control 
groups in 6 out of 15 Public Calls of the programme. Yet, data availability 
remains a significant concern for independent evaluations. Studies evaluating 
Projoven‘s impact have been conducted or sponsored by the programme 
operator or by former employees of the institution. These studies have applied 
diverse evaluation methods, such as: before-and-after comparisons, differences-
in-differences, cross-section–based estimators, and propensity score matching 
techniques. A summary of outcomes is given in Table 1. These studies report 
small improvements in employment prospects of up to 8%, but these are mostly 
insignificant, along with more substantial income gains—in one case exceeding 
100%. The results, in terms of magnitude, are similar to those observed for other 
YJTPs in Latin America (Betcherman et al., 2004 and Ibarrarán and Rosas, 2007). 
 
The differences observed among the estimates in the aforementioned studies 
illustrate and confirm the sensitivity of treatment-effect estimates to specification 
assumptions. Heckman and Smith (1997) explain that treatment effect estimators 
are highly dependent on model specifications. Some of these studies control for 
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selection into treatment and pre-treatment earnings dip,5 and almost all consider 
different sources of heterogeneity of treatment, such as gender or hometown. 
However, none of these studies considers methods that allow for the presence of 
unobservables, such as instrumental variables or fixed-effects estimators. Only 
some, such as Burga (2003), Chong and Galdo (2006), and Diaz and Jaramillo 
(2006) use differences-in-differences estimators in a propensity-score matching 
context. None of the studies present any specification tests; they assume based on 
observables, that unobservables are balanced between the treated group and the 
control group. 
 
The low completion rates of Projoven are also neglected in most of the studies. 
Failing to account for the low completion rate may bias the estimated effect of the 
programme. Heckman et al. (1998) and Heckman et al. (2000) pointed out that 
the unadjusted (by dropout) treatment effects estimates of the Job Training 
Partnership Act (JTPA) understate the effect of the training. Furthermore, 
empirical evidence suggests that job-training programmes are more effective 
once they are completed (Mealli et al., 1996); or yield higher returns the longer 
the trainees are exposed to training (Flores-Lagunes et al. 2007; Kluve et al., 
2007). Regarding Projoven-Peru, only Chacaltana et al. (2003) and Chong and 
Galdo (2006) present estimations that, to some extent, do consider the impact of 
Projoven‘s low completion rate. 
 
Using data from the sixth Public Call, Chacaltana et al. (2003) run cross-sectional 
OLS regressions of relative changes in hourly wages controlling for demographic 
variables, labour-related variables, and participation in Projoven. These 
regressions estimate Projoven‘s effects six, twelve, and eighteen months post-
programme. The low completion factor is taken into account via dummy 
variables that split Projoven‘s effect into two parts. The first dummy is activated 
for individuals who completed the first part of training but not the second. The 
second dummy is activated once the trainee has fully completed the training 
sequence. Chacaltana et al. (2003) find that the programme leads to increases in 
participants‘ monthly wages of about 18% to the extent that they completed the 
entire training sequence, but only in the short-run (six months post-programme). 
These investigators find no effects on trainee earnings after twelve months of 
either classroom training or on-the-job internship. We must note that Chacaltana 
et al. (2003) do not control for any pre-programme earnings dip, for selection into 
work, or for possible endogeneity of training completion. 
 
Chong and Galdo (2006), using data from the first eight Public Calls of Projoven, 
apply a difference-in-differences approach with local linear propensity score 
                                                 
5  Pre-treatment earnings dip refers to the decline in trainee earnings prior to training in 
comparison with the control group. In Section 4, a more detailed discussion addresses this topic. 
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matching. They find positive and statistically significant returns in terms of 
monthly wages, which are larger for trainees who completed both phases of the 
programme in comparison with trainees who completed only the first phase. 
These authors take into account a pre-programme earnings dip in their matching 
process, but training completion is considered as if randomly assigned. 
 
Evidence on Projoven evaluations suggests that the programme yields positive 
returns with respect to trainee employment likelihood and earnings. 
Nevertheless, the non-experimental design of these evaluations and the low 
completion phenomenon threaten the validity of these results. Questions remain 
about whether programme effects remain positive once corrections for sample 
selection and completion are considered. 
 
 
4. Data 
 
To evaluate Projoven effects on trainees‘ labour market outcomes, we use the 
Projoven sixth Public Call data set. This unique data set combines not only 
demographic information about trainees and the control group, but also 
administrative records on level of training completion. It allows us to match 
individual trainees with their specific training provider. Additionally, this was 
the only data set with the characteristics required for this study. 
 
The Projoven sixth Public Call data set consists of a baseline survey, conducted in 
November 1999 (two to three months prior to programme commencement), and 
three follow-up comparison surveys: six months post-programme (May 2001), 
twelve months post-programme (November 2001), and eighteen months post-
programme (May 2002). Consequently, we observe individuals at four points in 
time.6 
 
Participation level 
 
The Projoven sixth Public Call data set includes 1,014 participants and an equal 
number of control group individuals. As reported in Figure 1, only 2.2% of 
sampled trainees did not complete classroom training. Some 41% of trainees 
completed the classroom training phase, but not the on-the-job training phase. 
The remaining 57% of trainees completed both phases of Projoven. Some 15.9% 
of trainees completed the classroom phase but were not placed in training firms 
by the ECAPs. 
                                                 
6 Although the classroom training courses start at the same time, some delays occur before on-
the-job training begins. Consequently, not all internships conclude at the same time. This affects 
the time at which follow-up surveys are carried out. 
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Participants who spent only 1 or 2 months in Projoven are excluded from the 
estimation sample (2.2%). It is unlikely that the programme yields measurable 
returns to trainees after such a short period and their number is too small to 
draw specific inferences. Thus, any participation in the programme implies 
completion of at least the classroom phase. We will, however, allow the training 
effect to vary by completion level. 
 
Control group formation 
 
To construct a control group, Projoven selects three comparable individuals per 
trainee, all required to be eligible and to satisfy enrolment requirements. The 
selection of control group individuals begins 2 months after training begins. The 
programme operator searches for potential controls in the same neighbourhoods 
as the actual trainees, or in the closest possible neighbourhoods within the same 
district. The rationale for this is that neighbourhood characteristics control for 
unobservable factors such as geographic segregation, transportation costs, firm 
location, etc., which may affect the likelihood of finding employment, and the 
potential outcomes of the training programme (Chong and Galdo, 2006). 
According to Friedlander and Robins (1995), the selection of control group 
individuals from the same geographic areas as the actual trainees produces 
treatment effect estimators that are close to the experimental ones. Projoven 
matches individuals in the control group with the trainees based on sex, age, 
labour status, poverty score, and education level. To be an adequate control for a 
participant trainee, an individual must: 
 
- be of the same sex as the participant, 
- be within a two-year age range around that of the participant, 
- be within a five-point range with regard to the poverty score,7 and 
- have the same education level as the trainee. 
 
All criteria must be satisfied simultaneously. Next, among the three controls 
selected per beneficiary, Projoven cleans and matches them one-to-one using a 
Mahalanobis metric approach.8 
 
                                                 
7 Table A1 of the Appendix explains the composition of the poverty score index. 
8  Under this method, every trainee i  is matched with the control individual j  whose 
Mahalanobis distance is minimum. Mahalanobis distance:    ji
t
ji SSSS 
1
, where iS  is 
a vector containing the variables subject to matching for individual i , in this case sex, age, 
poverty score and education, and   is an estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the 
variables in iS  and jS . 
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Non-experimental design and pre-programme earnings dip 
 
Projoven‘s control matching is based on individual information at baseline 
(November 1999, 2 to 3 months prior to programme start). In the first two 
columns, [A] and [B], of Table 2, we observe that the original Projoven match in 
the sixth Public Call is perfectly executed at the level of cities of origin, education 
level, poverty score, labour status, and age. Nevertheless, there are notable 
differences in labour income and working hours, along with other variables. For 
instance, the difference in household income per capita suggests that the treated 
group is poorer than the control group. Another difference of concern is related 
to monthly wages prior to training. The average monthly wage for the control 
group is almost double the equivalent measure for the treated group. Such 
differences cast doubt on the comparability of the treatment and control groups 
for purposes of treatment effect evaluation. 
 
This phenomenon of pre-programme earnings dip of the trainees is also notable 
in the fourth, eighth, and tenth Public Call surveys. This phenomenon is 
sometimes referred to as evidence of Ashenfelter‘s dip. 9  Ashenfelter (1978) 
observed that trainee earnings tend to fall (absolutely and relatively), with 
respect to the control group, the year immediately prior to treatment. Heckman 
and Smith (1999) argue that this is a characteristic of virtually all training 
programmes and that it occurs despite the substantial variation in eligibility 
rules among training programmes. The occurrence of such pre-programme dip 
suggests that part of the observed increase in earnings that seems to follow a 
training programme may be explained as a return to a permanent path of 
earnings, temporarily interrupted by a transitory downward shock. 
 
Coping with non-experimental design and pre-programme earnings dip 
 
The pre-programme earnings dip represents evidence of systematic differences 
between the treatment and control groups prior to training, undermining their 
comparability. Ashenfelter (1978) suggests using an (even) earlier period as the 
baseline to circumvent possible biases caused by the pre-programme earnings 
dip. Unfortunately, in our case, there is no earlier period available. To deal with 
the pre-treatment wage difference in Projoven data, Ñopo and Saavedra (2003); 
Ñopo et al. (2002); Projoven (2004), and Projoven (2005) suggest carrying out an 
additional individuals matching process. This additional matching procedure is 
adopted in this study to create a more comparable control group. 
 
Matched sampling aims to produce a control group of modest size that is similar 
to the treated group in terms of the distribution of observed characteristics 
                                                 
9 See Ñopo and Saavedra (2003), Ñopo et al. (2002), Projoven (2004), and Projoven (2005). 
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(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). The drawback of this method is that there may be 
exact matches for only 50% of trainees (matching one-to-one without 
replacement). Discarding treated individuals is not an option, especially as the 
unmatched treated individuals may differ systematically from the matched 
treated individuals.10 
 
We form a new control group using propensity-score matching with 
replacement. This allows us to keep all the treated individuals in the sample. It 
also implies that a control unit could be matched with one or more treated 
individuals. We match similar treated and non-treated individuals based on 
observables and labour force status transitions, as suggested by Heckman and 
Smith (1999). Based on Table 2 (columns [A] and [B]), we observe that apart from 
employment status transitions, work experience is an important predictor of 
Projoven participation. Additionally, being a non-wage family-business worker, 
not being married, not having children, and parents‘ higher education level, 
seem to encourage enrolment in training. 
 
To ensure a better match on income level, we create 20 subsamples (by city, 
employment status, and level of income), for which matching based on 
propensity score is applied. However, the propensity score function is estimated 
using the complete sample. In Table A2 of the appendix, the distribution of the 
groups is shown to confirm the common support property. Table A3 of the 
appendix reports the probit regression for participation in Projoven given 
eligibility. Figure A1 displays the distribution of the estimated propensity scores. 
 
Column [C] of Table 2 describes the new control group resulting from the one-to-
one matching with replacement based on the propensity score. In Table 2, 992 
individuals are counted in the control group, but there are actually only 488 
individuals—some are repeated. We observe that the differences in earnings 
between the treatment and control groups decline. Furthermore, we note that the 
groups are more similar with respect to household income per capita, having a 
child, being married and having an employment history prior to training. 
Henceforth, ‗control group‘ refers to the newly created control group. 
 
The new generated control group is similar in observables to the treated 
individuals. Propensity-score matching assumes that because the distribution of 
observables is similar, it is likely that the distribution of unobservables is also 
similar. However, the presence of unobservables, which affects both the outcome 
and selection into training, cannot be easily disregarded. Systematic differences 
not explained by the nature of the quasi-experiment constitute evidence that the 
non-experimental design failed to produce quasi-randomization. We test for 
                                                 
10 Leuven and Oosterbeek (2006) discuss the problems inherent in small control groups. 
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systematic differences prior to training between the newly created control group 
and the treated individuals. 
 
We regress employment condition and monthly wages on individual 
characteristics and Projoven sixth Public Call participation prior to the 
programme. The rationale of the regression is to test whether there are 
systematic differences between the treatment and control groups prior to 
training. This is observable in the coefficient of the Projoven variable. Appendix 
Table A4 shows the results of these regressions. Whereas in the case of 
employment we find no systematic differences prior to training (Projoven 
coefficient not statistically different from zero), we observe differences between 
treatment and control groups in monthly wages (Projoven coefficient statistically 
different from zero). This suggests that if the labour market outcome to evaluate 
is employment, fixed-effects estimators would yield consistent results. However, 
if we evaluate monthly wages, the results may be affected by the presence of 
unobservables. Fortunately, it is possible to test how sensitive our estimates are 
given this circumstance. 
 
The treatment effect literature (Rosenbaum, 1995; and Lee, 2005, Chapter 5) 
suggests several techniques to assess the impact of unobservables in treatment 
effect estimations. We use the Rosenbaum approach to measure how biases of 
various magnitudes might alter results. This approach does not indicate whether 
biases are present or what magnitude of bias is acceptable. Rather, it indicates 
how large the bias caused by unobservables (hidden bias) must be in order to 
alter our conclusions. 
 
Rosenbaum‘s sensitivity analysis starts with the premise that hidden bias is 
present if two individuals j  and k  (one receiving treatment and the other not) 
with the same observed covariates x  ( kj xx  ) have different probability   of 
receiving the treatment ( kj   ). Now, let j  and k  be paired together. The odds 
that individuals j  and k  receive the treatment are, respectively,  jj  1  and 
 kk  1 , and the odds ratio is the ratio of these odds. Following Rosenbaum 
(1995), if we know that this odds ratio for individuals with the same covariates is 
at most some number 1 , then 
 
[Eq. 1]  
 
 




 jk
kj


1
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   for all j , k  with kj xx  . 
 
If 1 , the results are free of hidden bias. If 2 , two individuals with similar 
covariates could differ in their odds of receiving the treatment, so one could be 
twice as likely as the other to receive the treatment. A sensitivity analysis would 
17 
consider several possible values of   and show how the inferences might change 
accordingly (Rosenbaum, 1995). 
 
The results presented in Appendix Table A5 suggest that the effects of Projoven 
are not especially sensitive to the presence of hidden bias. Rosenbaum‘s analysis 
assumes matching without replacement. This could account for our finding. 
However, treatment effect estimation must address this issue. The availability of 
panel data for the Projoven sixth Public Call allows us to circumvent the possible 
distorted effect of time-constant unobservables in the estimation of Projoven 
treatment effects. 
 
 
5. Empirical framework 
 
Observational studies face not only the risk of potential hidden bias, but differing 
individuals levels of completion could bring about new sources of bias. We could 
underestimate the effects of the programme if these sources of bias materialize 
only on condition of completion. If the programme is not effective, we could 
attribute to the programme the wrong effect if the dropouts are better off. In this 
section, we develop a methodology to estimate Projoven treatment effect on 
trainees overall and specifically on formal employment and monthly wages. To 
mitigate the effects of different sources of bias in our analysis, four groups are 
compared pairwise: i) the control group with no treatment [G1], ii) the dropout 
group with only classroom training and no internship placement [G2], iii) the 
dropout group with classroom training and internship placement [G3], and iv) 
the treatment group with the full treatment (classroom training and internship) 
[G4]. Group composition is based on individual completion levels, as 
represented in Figure 2. 
 
The distribution of individuals over different completion levels allow us to 
classify Projoven effects on trainee labour market outcomes (overall and formal 
employment, and monthly wages) in three categories: (A) the effect of 
participation in the programme, (B) the effect of internship placement, and (C) 
the effect of internship completion. 
 
The effect of participation in the programme 
 
To identify the effect of Projoven participation, we compare [G2] vs. [G1], [G3] 
vs. [G1], and [G4] vs. [G1]. A general specification of individual labour market 
outcomes is given by: 
 
[Eq. 2]  ittiitit XY   1itProjoven , 
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where 
itY  labour market outcome (overall or formal employment or wages) of 
individual i  in period t ; 
itX  a row vector of measured individual characteristics affecting labour market 
outcomes; 
itProjoven  a dummy variable measuring programme participation (1: only for 
trainees in the post-training periods; 0: otherwise); 
i an error term specific to individual i  and constant over time; 
t  an error term specific to period t , and constant across individuals; 
it  an idiosyncratic error term specific to individual i  at period t ; and 
with   being a column vector of unknown parameters and 1  being the 
unknown programme effect. 
 
The presence of unobservables constant over time, i , can be circumvented by 
using fixed-effects estimators. These also allow for correlation between the 
unobservables and the explanatory variables, such as Projoven. 
 
We use a threefold strategy for estimating the effects of Projoven participation. 
First, to estimate the effect on overall employment, we use a linear probability 
model (LPM) using fixed-effects estimators, as in: 
 
[Eq. 3] ittiitit XY   3it2it1it Projoven*18DProjoven*12DProjoven , 
 
where D12 and D18 are time dummies corresponding to the periods twelve and 
eighteen months after training, respectively. The interaction of these dummies 
and the Projoven variable allows the treatment to vary over time. Thus, the effect 
of Projoven sixth Public Call participation after six months, after twelve months 
and after eighteen months are represented by 1 ; 21   ; and 31   , 
respectively. 
 
Next, to estimate Projoven effects on formal employment, we use an LPM with 
fixed-effects estimator that corrects for sample selection (Wooldridge, 1995). 
These estimations follow a two-step approach. First, we use a standard Tobit 
regression of hours worked on observable covariates for each time period. 
Second, following Wooldridge (1995), the residuals of these estimations are 
included as additional regressors in [Eq. 3], which is estimated using fixed-effects 
estimators. 
 
Finally, the Wooldridge (1995) procedure is used to estimate Projoven effects on 
monthly wages. 
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The effect of Projoven internship placement 
 
Internship placement is observed only in the case of trainees. Consequently, we 
rule out control group individuals from these estimations. To identify this effect, 
we compare [G3] vs. [G2], and [G4] vs. [G2]. To estimate the effects of internship 
placement on employment, we use an LPM fixed-effects estimator. In the case of 
effects on formal employment and monthly wages, we use the sample selection 
correction approach for fixed effects suggested by Wooldridge (1995). If we 
assume that trainees share similar observable and unobservable covariates, the 
methods suggested would yield consistent estimates of the programme effect. 
 
We believe that internship placement is independent of trainee labour market 
outcomes, because internship placement does not depend on a trainee decision. 
Internship placement is a process that depends entirely on the ECAP‘s ability to 
network and place students. Additionally, Lee (2005, Chapter 5, Section 2) 
suggests that if the results are coherent with other auxiliary findings, we may 
claim that the assignment, in this case into internship, is not affected by 
unobservables. For instance, trainees who drop out of the internship should not 
have different outcomes than trainees who were not assigned into internships. 
We find that the coefficient of internship placement in the comparison of [G3] 
and [G2] is not statistically different from zero (See Panel B of Tables 3, 4 and 5). 
This lends support to our initial assumption of random assignment into 
internships. Additionally, the results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test in all the 
regressions indicate that the two-stage least squares specification is not the most 
efficient one. Nevertheless, we allow our estimates for potential endogeneity of 
internship completion. 
 
To allow for potential endogeneity of internship placement, we use a pooled, 
two-stage least squares estimation, as suggested by Semykina and Wooldridge 
(2005). This method accounts for both possible endogeneity of training 
completion and sample selection. The sample selection correction is necessary in 
the formal employment and monthly wage models. The Semykina and 
Wooldridge approach follows a two-step procedure. First, it estimates probit 
regressions of employment condition in every period, adding Mundlak terms as 
regressors.11 From this, standard inverse Mills ratios are estimated. Second, it 
                                                 
11 Mundlak terms consist of within-group means of several independent variables. In our case, 
these include: potential experience, household income per capita, being married, and having a 
child. With this strategy, unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to consist of two parts. The first 
part is uncorrelated with the observed variables. The second part is assumed to vary linearly with 
the group means, whereby a possible correlation between the independent variables and the 
unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for (Mundlak, 1978). The correlation between Mundlak 
terms and the exogenous variables does not affect our Projoven coefficients. We include in the 
Appendix [Table A25–Table A30] the results of the estimations using differently defined 
Mundlak terms (initial values instead of time averages), and without the use of Mundlak terms. 
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models trainee labour market outcomes using pooled, two-stage least squares, 
adding as regressors the inverse Mills ratios and Mundlak terms for those 
individuals whose labour market outcomes are observed. The sample selection 
correction is excluded in the estimations of internship completion effects on 
overall employment. 
 
We use as instruments for internship placement the type of ECAP—that is, CEO 
(centre for vocational training) and guilds (vocational centres sponsored by 
guilds). The rationale for the use of ECAP types as instruments is based on the 
fact that trainees do not know beforehand in which ECAP they will end up. Less 
than 20% of trainees are granted their first choice (Projoven, 2002). In addition, 
there is no way for trainees to know the returns on the training (of any ECAP) 
prior to training. To test this last statement, we include a regression of labour 
market outcomes on ECAP type. In Appendix Table A6 and Table A7, we 
observe that the type of ECAP has no impact on employment condition and 
monthly wages. As two types of ECAP are added as instruments, it is possible to 
perform the Sargan test of over-identification. In all cases, this test cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the instruments are suitable. The model is set up as follows: 
 
[Eq. 4]  
itti
t
itt
itit
Z
XY



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

4
1
3it2it1it
ˆ        
Internship*18DInternship*12DInternship
 , 
 
where Internship is a dummy variable measuring internship placement (1: for 
trainees in the post-training periods placed in internships; 0: otherwise), iZ  
represents a row vector containing the Mundlak terms, and itˆ  represents the 
estimated inverse Mills ratios. Thus, the effect of the Projoven internship after six 
months, after twelve months and after eighteen months is represented as 1 ; 
21   ; and 31   , respectively. 
 
The effect of Projoven internship completion 
 
Internship completion is observed only for trainees who are placed in 
internships. Therefore, the evaluation sample in this case consists of trainees 
placed in internships ([G4] and [G3]). To evaluate the effects of internship 
completion on overall employment, we use the same techniques applied to 
evaluate the effects of internship placement. Additionally, we allow our estimate 
for endogeneity of internship completion. As in the previous case, ECAP type – 
                                                                                                                                                 
We observe that Projoven internship placement effect and Projoven internship completion effect 
vary very little with respect to the results with Mundlak terms. 
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that is, CEO (centre for vocational training) and guilds (vocational centres 
sponsored by guilds) is used as an instrumental variable. 
 
Projoven heterogeneous treatment effects 
 
We test whether Projoven sixth Public Call participation or Projoven internship 
placement effect varies across particular individual characteristics; multiplicative 
dummies of Projoven participation (or, Projoven internship placement or 
Projoven internship completion) with these individual characteristics are added. 
Among such characteristics, we consider gender, work experience condition 
prior to training, and whether the trainee is in the lowest quartile of household 
income per capita prior to training. 
 
[Eq. 5] 
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 , 
 
where Fem is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual is female, 
Noexp indicates whether an individual has no experience prior to training, and 
Quart signals whether the individual is in the lowest quartile of household 
income per capita prior to training. Thus, the additional effects of the programme 
for women after six months, after twelve months and after eighteen months are 
represented by 4 ; 54   ; and 64   , respectively. In the case of trainees with 
no work experience prior to training, the estimated additional effects of the 
programme after six months, after twelve months and after eighteen months are 
represented by 7 ; 87   ; and 97   , respectively. Finally, in the case of 
trainees in the lowest household income per capita quartile prior to training, the 
estimated additional effects of the programme after six months, after twelve 
months and after eighteen months are represented by 10 ; 1110   ; and 1210   , 
respectively. 
 
In order to allow for the inclusion of variables that do not change over time, 
random effects estimators are used. For consistency, we condition these 
estimations on our previous fixed-effects results. We use as a dependent variable 
the residuals (with individual effects) of the estimations of Projoven effects on 
overall and formal employment and wages. As explanatory variables, Projoven 
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interactions with time and with corresponding individual characteristics are 
considered. 
 
 
6. Results 
 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 display estimated Projoven sixth Public Call effects on overall 
employment, formal employment, and monthly wages, respectively. All three 
tables show the effects of the training over time and include three panels: A) 
Effects of Projoven participation, B) Effects of internship placement, and C) 
Effects of internship completion. These tables are complemented by Tables 6, 7 
and 8, which present Projoven sixth Public Call effects on overall employment, 
formal employment, and monthly wages, respectively, allowing for endogeneity 
of internship placement and internship completion. Tables 9, 10, and 11 allow for 
the treatment to vary across particular individual characteristics. To allow 
heterogeneous treatment across individual characteristics, a more restrictive 
specification, random effects estimators, is used. Consequently, the estimates in 
Tables 9, 10, and 11 are presented as indicative of Projoven treatment effects 
across individual characteristics. 
 
Projoven effects on overall employment 
 
Table 3 sets forth the effects of the Projoven sixth Public Call on overall 
employment.12 We observe that with respect to the no-programme situation, 
Projoven fails to yield permanent returns on employment at any level of 
completion (Panel A). However in the short run (six months post-training), the 
programme increases by 9% the likelihood of individual employment, but only 
for trainees who complete the internship (Panel A, [G4] vs. [G1] first column). 
This effect diminishes over time to the extent of becoming negative in the long-
run (eighteen months post-training). 
 
With respect to internship placement effects, we find no significant estimates 
over time (Panel B). The fact that the comparison of [G3] and [G2] generates no 
significant effects shows that internship placement could be regarded as if 
randomly assigned. The only difference between individuals in [G3] with respect 
to [G2] is that the [G2] individuals are not placed in internships. Since [G3] 
individuals did not complete the training, we would not expect a positive 
reward. These results also hold when allowing for internship placement to be 
endogenous as shown in Table 6. Table 6 shows that none of the coefficients 
reflecting the effect of internship placement are statistically significant. The same 
                                                 
12 Table 3 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A8, 
A9, and A10. 
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phenomenon is observed in the estimations of formal employment and monthly 
wages. 
 
In the case of internship completion, we observe that Projoven increases 
employment likelihood by 10% (Table 3, Panel C, [G4] vs. [G3], first column). The 
effects of internship completion hold in the medium-term (twelve months post-
training) and disappear in the long-run (eighteen months post-training) (Panel C, 
[G4] vs. [G3], second and third columns). The returns are similar when allowing 
the treatment to be endogenous (Table 6, Panel B, [G4] vs. [G3]).13 However, the 
returns are of a different magnitude (24%) and do not vary significantly in the 
medium- or long-run. 
 
Table 9 reports the effects of Projoven sixth Public Call while allowing for 
heterogeneous treatment across certain individual characteristics.14 We observe 
that the training yields no additional returns to women nor to individuals in the 
lowest household income per capita quartile prior to training (Panels A, B and 
C). However, Projoven increases the employment likelihood of individuals with 
no working experience prior to training at any the level of completion. These 
effects seem to be persistent and are greater in the long-run (eighteen months 
post-programme), conditioned on completion of training. 
 
In summary, with respect to employment likelihood, Projoven yields limited 
returns. Only individuals who complete the treatment [G4] experience positive 
and significant returns compare to non-participants [G1] and compare to 
dropouts [G3]. The effects of the programme are greater for those individuals 
with no work experience prior to training, regardless of their level of completion. 
 
Projoven effects on formal employment, controlling for sample selection 
 
Table 4 sets forth the estimated effects of the Projoven sixth Public Call on formal 
employment, corrected for sample selection. 15 The programme fails to yield any 
returns on trainees‘ formal employment condition when compared to non-
participants [G1]. The coefficients estimated in Panel A are not significant. 
 
Internship placement with respect to no internship placement increases the 
likelihood of employment in the formal labour market. However, these effects 
are not statistically significant (Panel B). Allowing internship placement to be 
                                                 
13
 Table 6 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A15, 
A16, and A17. 
14 Table 9 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A18, 
A19, and A24. 
15 Table 4 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A10, 
A11, and A12.  
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endogenous shows similar results, but of different magnitude. Table 7 shows 
estimated effects larger than those in Table 4, but these are not significant.16 
 
Comparison of [G4] and [G3] confirms that internship completion is rewarded 
more than dropping out. The returns obtained remain constant over time. No 
evidence of additional significant effects is found in the medium- and long-run 
(Table 4, Panel C, [G4] vs. [G3], second and third columns). The same results 
hold when allowing internship completion to be endogenous; however, the 
effects almost double in magnitude (Table 7, Panel C). 
 
In the case of heterogeneous treatment, we find significant and positive effects 
only for those individuals with no work experience prior to training and for 
those in the lowest household income per capita quartile (Table 10). 17 In the case 
of trainees with no work experience, these effects are conditioned on training 
completion compared to trainees not placed in internships (Table 10, Panel B, 
[G4] vs. [G2]). In the case of trainees in the lowest quartile, the effects are greater 
for the dropouts with internship placement [G3] compared to the non-
participants [G1] (Table 10, Panel A, [G3] vs. [G1]). 
 
In summary, the programme fails to yield returns with respect to formal 
employment. However, internship completion is rewarded more than dropping 
out in this respect. The effects of internship completion are persistent. As in the 
case of overall employment, Projoven produces additional returns to those 
individuals with no work experience and, in addition, to those in the lowest 
household income per capita quartile. 
 
Projoven effects on monthly wages, controlling for sample selection 
 
Table 5 sets forth estimated Projoven sixth Public Call effects on monthly wages 
corrected for sample selection. 18  Panel A shows that compared to non-
participants [G1], Projoven increases trainee wages by more than 30% for those 
who were at least placed in internships ([G3] and [G4]). These effects diminish 
significantly over time for programme completers [G4]. As discussed above, 
these results must be taken as indicative because we find systematic differences 
between trainees and the control group prior to training, in terms of wages. 
 
                                                 
16
 Table 7 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A15, 
A16, and A17. 
17 Table 10 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A20, 
A22, and A24. 
18 Table 5 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A10, 
A13, and A14. 
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Panel B shows that internship placement yields no significant returns on monthly 
wages compared to the no-internship placement situation; the effects are even 
negative in the medium- and long-run (Panel B, [G4] vs. [G2], second and third 
columns). The results change only in terms of magnitude when allowing 
internship placement to be endogenous (Table 8).19 However, in the endogenous 
specification, effects are not significant. 
 
Completing the Projoven internship relative to dropping out is definitively 
worthwhile, although the effects are not persistent and diminish over time. 
Controlling for internship completion endogeneity (Table 8, Panel B) does not 
change this assessment; only its magnitude differs. 
 
In Table 11, we report estimates of Projoven sixth Public Call effects on monthly 
wages allowing for heterogeneous treatment across particular individual 
characteristics. 20  We observe that in comparison to non-participants and 
dropouts, Projoven yields additional returns for those trainees with no work 
experience prior to the training and for those in the lowest household income per 
capita quartile. For women, the programme is effective only in the long-run 
(eighteen months post-training), conditioned on completion ([G4]), compared to 
dropouts ([G2] and [G3]). 
 
To summarize, with respect to monthly wages, Projoven can be regarded as an 
effective programme. The programme generates positive and significant returns 
for those trainees who at least were placed in an internship ([G3] and [G4]) in 
comparison to non-participation [G1]. Additionally, completing the training [G4] 
is rewarded more than dropping out [G3]. Finally, the effects of the programme 
are greater for those individuals with no work experience prior to training and 
for those in the lowest household income per capita quartile. For women, 
positive effects are observed only in the long-run conditioned on completion. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In Latin America, YJTPs are regarded as effective policy interventions. Studies 
have shown that these programmes raise trainee employment rates and wages, 
particularly for women (Betcherman et al., 2004 and Ibarrarán and Rosas, 2007). 
Nevertheless, these evaluations do not account for the low completion 
phenomenon. YJTPs in the region suffer from substantial dropout issues. On 
average, less than 70% of trainees complete the training. The analysis of Projoven 
                                                 
19
 Table 8 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A15, 
A16, and A17. 
20 Table 11 is a summary table. Complete regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A21, 
A23, and A24. 
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sixth Public Call, a typical YJTP in the region, sheds light on the importance of 
controlling for low completion rates and the presence of unobservables in 
treatment effect estimations. This study addresses these issues. We reach four 
general conclusions: 
 
First, the programme is not as effective as originally thought, in terms of 
employment, compared to non-participation [G1]. Only in the short run (six 
months post-training) and conditionally on internship completion [G4], do we 
observe a positive effect (of 9%) on overall employment. This effect is not 
permanent and decreases over time. In addition, the programme produces no 
significant returns on formal employment; however, internship completion is 
more rewarded than dropping out in this respect. 
 
Second, Projoven seems to be an effective policy intervention in terms of monthly 
wages. The programme increases monthly wages of trainees by more than 30% at 
all levels of completion. However, the effects on wages, which are in line with 
estimations from the literature, cannot be fully attributed to training. Although 
the construction of a new control group reduced significantly the differences in 
wages between the control group and trainees prior to the programme, some 
systematic differences are still observed. The fact that the programme yields no 
returns on formal employment excludes the possibility of explaining wage 
increases via productivity enhancement or trainees having better jobs. Actually, 
it seems that trainees work more hours in the same type of precarious jobs they 
would be working in the absence of the programme; our auxiliary Tobit 
regressions of hours worked proved this to be true. 
 
Third, ignoring dropouts could lead to misleading conclusions about the effects 
of YJTPs. In the case of Projoven sixth Public Call, we observe that classroom 
training alone yields no returns on trainees overall, nor on formal employment or 
monthly wages. Nevertheless, once enrolled, the enrolee is definitively better off 
from completion of training. Under no circumstances are dropouts ([G2] and 
[G3]) better off with respect to employment prospects or wages. These results 
hold even when allowing for internship placement and completion to be 
endogenously determined. 
 
Finally, our results suggest that the programme yields greater returns on overall 
and formal employment conditions for trainees with no work experience prior to 
training. In terms of monthly wages, the programme produces additional returns 
for individuals with no work experience and for those in the lowest household 
income per capita prior to training, but conditioned on completion [G4]. 
Contrary to previous findings, we do not find additional effects for women. We 
suspect the literature confounds the additional effects across individual 
characteristics with gender. Economically disadvantaged women are more likely 
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to not have much work experience when they are young. However, these results 
must be taken as indicative, since our specification (random effects estimators) is 
more restricted. 
 
To conclude, confounding the effects of unobservables and low completion rates 
yields a different picture of Projoven effects on trainee labour market outcomes. 
Decomposing programme effects by level of completion suggests that the 
programme is more effective, particularly with respect to wages and overall 
employment, conditioned on completion. Additionally, our results might imply a 
need to revise the targeting strategy and the official goals of the programme. In 
order to enhance training effects, the programme operator must encourage the 
participation of individuals with no work experience. In the low-skill job market, 
experience is regarded as more relevant than educational credentials. For youth 
with no work experience, attaining first-time employment is almost impossible in 
Peru. Thus, programmes that provide an internship (work experience) definitely 
impact their chances in the labour market. Given this, Projoven should consider 
strategies to make training more attractive and implement the right incentives 
for trainees to complete training. Further research is needed in order to 
determine why trainees drop out of the programme, particularly when 
completing the programme is demonstrably more rewarding. 
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Table 1. 
Estimated effects of Projoven on overall employment and wages. 
Study Public 
Call 
Effect on employment Effect on monthly wages Technique 
6 M 12 M 18 M 6 M 12 M 18 M 
Galdo (1998) 1    60%***   B&A 
Burga (2003)1 2 8.2%* 25.9%*** 11.8%*** 28.7%* 41.8%*** 28.6%* PSMK 
Chacaltana and Sulmont 
(2004) 
2    44.8%* 29.4% 40.2%** OLS 
4    38%** 54.5%*** 50.6%***  
Ñopo et al. (2002) 2 6 6.0%***   18%**   PSMNN 
Ñopo and Saavedra 
(2003)3 
6 -1.7% -1.9% 3.2% 43.4% 30.3% 37.8% PSMK 
Chacaltana et al. (2003) 2 6    12%* n. r. 13%* OLS 
Projoven (2004) 3 8 2.7% 2.6%  46.0% 40.3%  D-D 
Projoven (2005) 3 10 2.0%   -3.0%   PSMK 
Díaz and Jaramillo (2006) 1 -2.0% 1.0% 8.0% 88.2%*** 88.0%*** 81.0%*** PSMK 
2 4.0% 8.0% 1.0% 74.9%*** 111.8%*** 53.2%**  
4 3.0% 4.0% 3.0% 44.5%*** 45.1%*** 64.0%***  
6 3.0% -2.0% 2.0% 33.0%*** 33.0%*** 44.4%***  
8 5.0% 6.0%  57.3%*** 65.5%***   
Chong and Galdo (2006) 1    70%* 24% 58%* LLME 
2    52%* 73%** 61%**  
4    40%* 11% 34%  
6    33%* -5% 20%  
8    67%*** 89%***   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Notes: 
6 M: 6 months after the programme; 12 M: 12 months after the programme; 18 M: 18 months after 
the programme 
n. r.: Not reported. 
B&A: Before-and-after comparison. 
D-D: Diff-in-Diff (simple version). 
PSMK: Diff-in-Diff with propensity score matching kernel estimator. 
PSMNN: Diff-in-Diff with propensity score matching nearest neighbour. 
LLME: Diff-in-Diff with local linear matching estimator. 
1 The effect on employment refers to the effect on hours worked. 
2 The effect on wages refers to the effect on hourly wages. 
3 These studies do not report standard errors. 
33 
Table 2. 
Baseline summary statistics [2–3 months before training]. Projoven sixth Public Call. 
 
Official control 
group [A] Treated group [B] 
New control 
group [C] 
p-value [mean 
differences]2 
 
Mean 
 
Std. 
dev. 
Mean 
 
Std. 
dev. 
Mean 
 
Std. 
dev. 
[A] vs. 
[B] 
[B] vs. 
[C] 
         
Total 1,014 992 992   
City         
Arequipa 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41) 0.804 1.000 
Chiclayo 0.12 (0.33) 0.11 (0.31) 0.11 (0.31) 0.509 1.000 
Cusco 0.12 (0.32) 0.12 (0.32) 0.12 (0.32) 0.858 1.000 
Lima 0.36 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48) 0.963 1.000 
Trujillo 0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 0.938 1.000 
Age (years) 19.76 (2.35) 19.60 (2.44) 19.72 (2.41) 0.133 0.301 
Female 0.51 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50) 0.55 (0.50) 0.790 0.163 
Poverty score 18.95 (2.95) 16.71 (4.13) 18.78 (2.97) 0.000 0.000 
Household income per capita (S/.) 150.27 (85.28) 127.40 (91.31) 129.79 (77.95) 0.000 0.476 
Child  0.24 (0.43) 0.14 (0.35) 0.15 (0.36) 0.000 0.487 
Married 0.22 (0.41) 0.10 (0.30) 0.12 (0.32) 0.000 0.253 
Years schooling 10.45 (1.30) 10.45 (1.34) 10.42 (1.34) 1.000 0.558 
Father tertiary education 0.08 (0.27) 0.12 (0.33) 0.10 (0.30) 0.001 0.085 
Mother tertiary education 0.03 (0.17) 0.06 (0.25) 0.04 (0.18) 0.000 0.005 
Labour market status         
Employed 0.60 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49) 0.964 1.000 
Unemployed 0.29 (0.46) 0.27 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44) 0.183 0.839 
Inactive 0.10 (0.30) 0.13 (0.34) 0.13 (0.34) 0.052 0.790 
Transitions (%) (from October 1999 
to November 1999)         
Unemployed/OLF -> employed 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.28) 0.10 (0.29) 0.872 0.269 
Employed -> Unemployed/OLF 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.20) 0.03 (0.17) 0.911 0.230 
Unemployed/OLF -> 
Unemployed/OLF 0.41 (0.49) 0.46 (0.50) 0.42 (0.49) 0.025 0.161 
Employed -> employed 0.47 (0.50) 0.42 (0.49) 0.45 (0.50) 0.018 0.222 
No work experience 0.28 (0.45) 0.37 (0.48) 0.35 (0.48) 0.000 0.242 
Non-wage family-business worker 0.07 (0.25) 0.13 (0.34) 0.17 (0.37) 0.000 0.039 
Labour income1 (S/. 2001)         
Monthly1 238.71 (148.21) 158.93 (134.78) 173.65 (135.14) 0.000 0.053 
Hourly 1.49 (1.05) 1.12 (0.92) 1.23 (1.07) 0.000 0.049 
Working hours1 (week) 55.21 (139.06) 46.76 (114.75) 42.30 (83.67) 0.249 0.444 
1 Only considering individuals working in the reference period. 
2 Ho: Means differences = 0. 
Source: Projoven. 
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Table 3. 
Linear probability model - fixed effect estimations. Projoven sixth Public Call effects on 
overall employment by level of completion. 
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 
12 months 
[ 2ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 
18 months 
[ 3ˆ ] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven participation  
[G2] vs. [G1] 0.033 -0.036 -0.069 
 (0.059) (0.051) (0.056) 
[G3] vs. [G1] -0.006 -0.068 -0.018 
 (0.054) (0.045) (0.054) 
[G4] vs. [G1] 0.091** -0.105*** -0.125*** 
 (0.044) (0.036) (0.043) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] -0.041 -0.033 0.051 
 (0.062) (0.056) (0.057) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.055 -0.063 -0.049 
 (0.054) (0.048) (0.048) 
C. Effects of Projoven  internship completion  
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.103* -0,014 -0.109* 
 (0.061) (0.051) (0.059) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. 
[ 1ˆ ] represents the treatment effect 6 months after the training; with [ 2ˆ ], [ 3ˆ ] additional 
effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all models, the base periods are Nov-99 
and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Table 3 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A8, A9 
and A10. 
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Table 4. 
Linear probability model fixed-effects estimates with sample selection correction 
(Wooldridge, 1995). Projoven sixth Public Call effects on formal employment by level of 
completion.  
 
Effects after 
6 months 
[ 1ˆ ] 
Additional effects 
after 12 months 
[ 2ˆ ] 
Additional effects 
after 18 months 
[ 3ˆ ] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven participation  
[G2] vs. [G1] -0.046 -0.020 -0.123* 
 (0.085) (0.070) (0.069) 
[G3] vs. [G1] 0.012 -0.011 -0.078 
 (0.075) (0.055) (0.058) 
[G4] vs. [G1] 0.081 -0.010 -0.071 
 (0.065) (0.047) (0.049) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.032 0.031 0.036 
 (0.094) (0.077) (0.074) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.092 0.048 0.067 
 (0.076) (0.067) (0.063) 
C. Effects of Projoven  internship completion 
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.187* -0.014 -0.029 
 (0.097) (0.077) (0.071) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
[ 1ˆ ] represents the treatment effect 6 months after the training; with [ 2ˆ ], [ 3ˆ ] additional 
effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all models, the base periods are Nov-99 
and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Table 4 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A10, 
A11, and A12. 
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Table 5. 
Fixed-effects estimates with sample selection correction (Wooldridge, 1995). Projoven sixth 
Public Call effects on monthly wages by level of completion.  
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 12 
months 
[ 2ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 18 
months 
[ 3ˆ ] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven participation 
[G2] vs. [G1] 0.332 -0.025 0.105 
 (0.135) (0.096) (0.098) 
[G3] vs. [G1] 0.341*** 0.106 0.126 
 (0.124) (0.084) (0.095) 
[G4] vs. [G1] 0.382*** -0.140** -0.089 
 (0.095) (0.063) (0.066) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.087 0.073 -0.017 
 (0.143) (0.109) (0.109) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.109 -0.163* -0.268*** 
 (0.124) (0.088) (0.090) 
C. Effects of Projoven  internship completion 
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.351** -0.263** -0.354*** 
 (0.139) (0.110) (0.112) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals) 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
[ 1ˆ ] represents the treatment effect 6 months after the training; with [ 2ˆ ], [ 3ˆ ] additional 
effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all models, the base periods are Nov-99 
and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Table 5 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A10, 
A13, and A14. 
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Table 6. 
Pooled linear probability model – two-stage least squares estimates. Projoven sixth Public Call 
effects on overall employment by level of completion. Heterogeneous treatment over time and 
endogenous treatment. 
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 12 
months 
[ 2ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 
18 months 
[ 3ˆ ] 
Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test 
     
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement   
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.134 0.196 0.075  
2
3  = 3.27009 
 (0.401) (0.423) (0.408) P-val = 0.2709 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.255 -0.115 -0.137  
2
3  = 2.44577 
 (0.184) (0.201) (0.195) P-val = 0.48517 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion    
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.245* -0.131 0.010  
2
3  = 3.16819 
 (0.130) (0.143) (0.134) P-val = 0.36641 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
[ 1ˆ ] represents the treatment effect 6 months after the training; with [ 2ˆ ], [ 3ˆ ] additional 
effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Table 6 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A15, 
A16 and A17. 
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Table 7. 
Pooled linear probability model – two-stage least squares estimates with sample selection 
correction (Semykina and Wooldridge, 2006). Projoven sixth Public Call effects on formal 
employment by level of completion. Heterogeneous treatment over time and endogenous 
treatment. 
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 12 
months 
[ 2ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 
18 months 
[ 3ˆ ] 
Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test 
     
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement   
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.632 -0.104 -0.264  
2
3  = 6.10664 
 (0.510) (0.558) (0.510) P-val = 0.10654 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.747 0.039 -0.388  
2
3  = 4.26172 
 (0.781) (0.752) (0.745) P-val = 0.23455 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion   
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.442*** -0.009 -0.292  
2
3  = 3.73153 
 (0.166) (0.152) (0.255) P-val = 0.29195 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
[ 1ˆ ] represents the treatment effect 6 months after the training; with [ 2ˆ ], [ 3ˆ ] additional 
effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01 and May-
02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, 
and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all models the base periods are Nov-99 and May-
01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all individuals 
(treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Table 7 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A15, 
A16 and A17. 
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Table 8. 
Pooled two-stage least squares estimates with sample selection correction (Semykina and 
Wooldridge, 2006). Projoven sixth Public Call effects on monthly wages by level of 
completion. Heterogeneous treatment over time and endogenous treatment. 
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 12 
months 
[ 2ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects 
after 18 
months 
[ 3ˆ ] 
Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test 
     
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement    
[G3] vs. [G2] -0.277 0.692 -0.007  
2
3  = 1.25914 
 (0.764) (0.790) (0.746) P-val = 0.73886 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.652 0.502 -0.271  
2
3  = 4.33657 
 (1.109) (1.067) (1.053) P-val = 0.22734 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion   
[G4] vs. [G3] 1.051* -0.714 -0.622  
2
3  = 3.55694  
 (0.625) (0.508) (0.605) P-val = 0.31345 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
[ 1ˆ ] represents the treatment effect 6 months after the training; with [ 2ˆ ], [ 3ˆ ] additional 
effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Table 8 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A15, 
A16, and A17. 
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Table 9. 
Linear probability model – random effects estimates. Projoven sixth Public Call effects on 
overall employment by level of completion. Heterogeneous treatment over time and across 
individual characteristics. 
 
Effects 
females 
after 6 
months 
 
 
[ 4ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
females 
after 12 
months 
 
 
[ 5ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
females 
after 18 
months 
 
 
[ 6ˆ ] 
Effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 6 
months 
[ 7ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 12 
months 
[ 8ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 18 
months 
[ 9ˆ ] 
Effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 6 
months 
[ 10ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 12 
months 
[ 11ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 18 
months 
[ 12ˆ ] 
          
A. Effects of Projoven participation         
[G2] vs. [G1] -0.079 0.084 0.011 0.167** -0.01 0.003 -0.013 -0.052 -0.01 
 (0.067) (0.073) (0.077) (0.068) (0.079) (0.082) (0.077) (0.083) (0.084) 
[G3] vs. [G1] -0.114* 0.100 0.084 0.148** -0.074 0.085 0.012 -0.026 -0.055 
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.070) (0.068) (0.068) (0.076) (0.071) (0.068) (0.080) 
[G4] vs. [G1] -0.069* -0.013 0.000 0.243*** -0.043 0.093* 0.029 0.023 0.007 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship placement       
[G3] vs. [G2] -0.095 0.102 0.106 0.108 -0.067 0.105 0.009 -0.020 -0.032 
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.070) (0.068) (0.069) (0.076) (0.069) (0.068) (0.079) 
[G4] vs. [G2] -0.049 0.000 0.041 0.241*** -0.038 0.106** 0.014 0.027 0.018 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.045) (0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) (0.053) 
C. Effects of Projoven internship completion      
[G4] vs. [G3] -0.051 0.01 0.056 0.282*** -0.034 0.118** 0.017 0.031 0.030 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.046) (0.050) (0.048) (0.050) (0.055) (0.052) (0.053) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
[ 4ˆ ] represents the interactions with the ―female‖ dummy 6 months after the training; with [ 5ˆ ], [ 6ˆ ] 
additional effects in the following periods. 
[ 7ˆ ] represents the interactions with the ―no work experience‖ dummy 6 months after the training; with 
[ 8ˆ ], [ 9ˆ ] additional effects in the following periods. 
[ 10ˆ ] represents the interactions with the ―lowest quartile‖ dummy 6 months after the training; with [ 11ˆ ], 
[ 12ˆ ] additional effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This 
represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven and 18 months after 
Projoven, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are 
chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the 
programme (Nov-99). 
Table 9 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A18, A19 and 
A24. 
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Table 10. 
Linear probability model – random effects estimates with sample selection correction. 
Projoven sixth Public Call effects on formal employment by level of completion. 
Heterogeneous treatment over time and across individual characteristics. 
 
Effects 
females 
after 6 
months 
 
 
[ 4ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
females 
after 12 
months 
 
 
[ 5ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
females 
after 18 
months 
 
 
[ 6ˆ ] 
Effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 6 
months 
[ 7ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 12 
months 
[ 8ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 18 
months 
[ 9ˆ ] 
Effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 6 
months 
[ 10ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 12 
months 
[ 11ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 18 
months 
[ 12ˆ ] 
          
A. Effects of Projoven participation         
[G2] vs. [G1] -0.105 0.008 0.046 0.021 -0.090 0.089 0.031 0.003 0.003 
 (0.086) (0.102) (0.098) (0.097) (0.107) (0.102) (0.103) (0.108) (0.106) 
[G3] vs. [G1] -0.099 0.111 0.068 -0.062 -0.190* 0.034 0.159* -0.022 -0.08 
 (0.087) (0.097) (0.086) (0.098) (0.099) (0.095) (0.088) (0.102) (0.078) 
[G4] vs. [G1] -0.059 0.024 -0.011 0.094 -0.091 -0.064 -0.042 0.059 0.020 
 (0.047) (0.052) (0.052) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.063) (0.066) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship placement       
[G3] vs. [G2] -0.084 0.104 0.049 -0.059 -0.153 0.025 0.128 -0.064 -0.126 
 (0.091) (0.095) (0.088) (0.102) (0.101) (0.097) (0.097) (0.103) (0.080) 
[G4] vs. [G2] -0.058 0.009 -0.026 0.118* -0.099 -0.071 -0.058 0.053 -0.007 
 (0.049) (0.053) (0.052) (0.067) (0.063) (0.062) (0.071) (0.065) (0.067) 
C. Effects of Projoven internship completion      
[G4] vs. [G3] -0.092* 0.025 -0.033 0.085 -0.103 -0.078 0.009 0.046 0.002 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.074) (0.063) (0.061) (0.076) (0.063) (0.066) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
[ 4ˆ ] represents the interactions with the ―female‖ dummy 6 months after the training; with [ 5ˆ ], [ 6ˆ ] 
additional effects in the following periods. 
[ 7ˆ ] represents the interactions with the ―no work experience‖ dummy 6 months after the training; with 
[ 8ˆ ], [ 9ˆ ] additional effects in the following periods. 
[ 10ˆ ] represents the interactions with the ―lowest quartile‖ dummy 6 months after the training; with [ 11ˆ ], 
[ 12ˆ ] additional effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This 
represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven and 18 months after 
Projoven, respectively. In all the models the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are 
chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the 
programme (Nov-99). 
Table 10 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A20, A22 and 
A24. 
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Table 11. 
Random effects estimates with sample selection correction. Projoven sixth Public Call effects 
on monthly wages by level of completion, conditional on being employed. Heterogeneous 
treatment over time and across individual characteristics. 
 
Effects 
females 
after 6 
months 
 
 
[ 4ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
females 
after 12 
months 
 
 
[ 5ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
females 
after 18 
months 
 
 
[ 6ˆ ] 
Effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 6 
months 
[ 7ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 12 
months 
[ 8ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. no 
work 
experience 
after 18 
months 
[ 9ˆ ] 
Effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 6 
months 
[ 10ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 12 
months 
[ 11ˆ ] 
Add. 
effects 
indivs. 
lowest 
quartile 
after 18 
months 
[ 12ˆ ] 
          
A. Effects of Projoven participation         
[G2] vs. [G1] -0.151 -0.115 -0.146 -0.241 -0.03 0.312** 0.363* 0.142 -0.054 
 (0.182) (0.147) (0.155) (0.166) (0.134) (0.138) (0.208) (0.161) (0.155) 
[G3] vs. [G1] 0.000 -0.221* -0.168 -0.209 0.228* 0.211 0.040 0.089 0.061 
 (0.152) (0.122) (0.123) (0.177) (0.137) (0.168) (0.187) (0.126) (0.172) 
[G4] vs. [G1] -0.108 -0.061 0.085 0.193 -0.023 -0.001 0.215* 0.074 -0.047 
 (0.092) (0.066) (0.067) (0.126) (0.080) (0.080) (0.117) (0.085) (0.084) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship placement      
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.010 -0.189 -0.175 -0.110 0.268* 0.222 0.193 0.033 0.020 
 (0.158) (0.124) (0.127) (0.198) (0.141) (0.180) (0.203) (0.124) (0.169) 
[G4] vs. [G2] -0.124 -0.006 0.140** 0.353*** -0.002 0.042 0.482*** 0.078 -0.041 
 (0.100) (0.067) (0.068) (0.133) (0.082) (0.081) (0.126) (0.089) (0.089) 
C. Effects of Projoven internship completion      
[G4] vs. [G3] -0.140 -0.042 0.137** 0.370*** -0.015 0.023 0.422*** 0.098 -0.025 
 (0.094) (0.068) (0.068) (0.119) (0.084) (0.081) (0.119) (0.090) (0.089) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
[ 4ˆ ] represents the interactions with the ―female‖ dummy 6 months after the training; with [ 5ˆ ], [ 6ˆ ] 
additional effects in the following periods. 
[ 7ˆ ] represents the interactions with the ―no work experience‖ dummy 6 months after the training; with 
[ 8ˆ ], [ 9ˆ ] additional effects in the following periods. 
[ 10ˆ ] represents the interactions with the ―lowest quartile‖ dummy 6 months after the training; with [ 11ˆ ], 
[ 12ˆ ] additional effects in the following periods. 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and May-02. This 
represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, and 18 months after 
Projoven, respectively. In all the models the base periods are Nov-99 and May-01. Two base periods are 
chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all individuals (treatment and controls) before the 
programme (Nov-99). 
Table 11 is a summary table. Completed regression results are reported in Appendix Tables A21, A23 and 
A24. 
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Figure 1. 
Distribution of trainees by participation level. Projoven sixth Public Call. 
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Source: Projoven. Further elaboration by the authors. 
 
 
Figure 2. 
Evaluation sample. Projoven sixth Public Call. 
G4: Completers  
578 individuals
Internship 
placement
G3: Dropouts  
231 individuals
Trainees
G2: No Internship 
placement          
183 individuals
G0: Economically 
disadvantaged 
youngsters       
1984 individuals
G1: Control Group  
992 individuals  
Source: Projoven. Further elaboration by the authors. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. 
Poverty status index composition. 
Item Category 1 Score Category 2 Score Category 3 Score Category 4 Score 
         
Household 
Floor 
Land 4 Wood 3 Cement 2 Vinyl 0 
Household 
ceiling 
Residuals 4 Cardboard 3 Plastic, wood 2 Cement, 
concrete 
0 
Household 
walls 
Cardboard 4 Wood 3 Brick 
uncompleted 
2 Brick 
completed 
0 
Source of 
Potable water 
River or 
tanker 
4 Well 3 Outdoor 
public 
network 
1 Indoor 
public 
network 
0 
Toilet No toilet 4 latrine 3 Outdoor 
public 
network 
2 Indoor 
public 
network 
0 
Overcrowding1 >= 5 4 >= 4 and < 5 3 >= 3 and < 4 2 < 3 0 
Household 
head education 
level 
No 
education or 
uncompleted 
primary 
4 Secondary 
education 
2 Uncompleted 
tertiary 
education 
1 Completed 
tertiary 
education 
0 
Dependency 
ratio2 
>= 3 4 >= 2 and < 3 2 < 2 0   
Source: Burga (2003). 
Notes: 1. Ratio household size / number of rooms. 
             2. Ratio non-working household members / number working household members. 
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Table A2. 
Common support groups matching methods to conform control group. Projoven sixth Public 
Call. 
Group Characteristics Control Participants Total 
Group 1 Arequipa, not employed 56 59 115 
Group 2 Chiclayo, not employed 60 48 108 
Group 3 Cusco, not employed 40 43 83 
Group 4 Lima, not employed 177 170 347 
Group 5 Trujillo, not employed 69 74 143 
Group 6 Arequipa, income <= 100 47 100 147 
Group 7 Chiclayo, income <= 100 16 31 47 
Group 8 Cusco, income <= 100 20 26 46 
Group 9 Lima, income <= 100 29 69 98 
Group 10 Trujillo, income <= 100 16 39 55 
Group 11 Arequipa, 100 < income <= 300 68 39 107 
Group 12 Chiclayo, 100 < income <= 300 40 27 67 
Group 13 Cusco, 100 < income <= 300 38 32 70 
Group 14 Lima, 100 < income <= 300 86 85 171 
Group 15 Trujillo, 100 < income <= 300 75 46 121 
Group 16 Arequipa, income > 300 34 7 41 
Group 17 Chiclayo, income > 300 6 4 10 
Group 18 Cusco, income > 300 19 16 35 
Group 19 Lima, income > 300 76 37 113 
Group 20 Trujillo, income > 300 42 40 82 
Total  1,014 992 2,006 
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Table A3. 
Propensity score estimation. Probit model. Dependent variable.: participating in Projoven at 
baseline [Projoven = 1]. Conditioned on being eligible for the training. 
 Marginal 
effects 
Std. err. 
   
Ln hh income per capita -0.050* (0.027) 
Lowest quartile hh income per capita 0.063* (0.038) 
Age 0.014*** (0.005) 
Household size -0.004 (0.005) 
Female 0.000 (0.024) 
Married -0.171*** (0.039) 
Child -0.060 (0.043) 
Years schooling -0.013 (0.009) 
Father tertiary education 0.071* (0.040) 
Mother tertiary education 0.165*** (0.060) 
Additional training course 0.098*** (0.027) 
Unemployed/OLF -> employed 0.008 (0.043) 
Employed -> unemployed/OLF 0.023 (0.058) 
Unemployed/OLF -> 
unemployed/OLF 
-0.074** (0.036) 
No work experience (%) 0.175*** (0.037) 
Non-wage family business worker 0.203*** (0.038) 
   
Num observations 2006 
Wald X2(16) 151.97 
Log likelihood -1307.72 
Pseudo R2 0.0594 
* Statistically significant at 10%, ** statistically significant at 5%, *** statistically significant at 1%. 
Marginal effects are estimated at the median. 
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Table A4. 
Baseline OLS estimates. Test of systematic differences prior to training [new control group 
and treatment individuals sample]. 
 
Dep. var. overall employment Dep. var. ln monthly wages 
Coef. 
Std. 
err. Coef. 
Std. 
err. Coef. 
Std. 
err. Coef. 
Std. 
err. 
         
Projoven 0.000 (0.032) -0.004 (0.030) -0.242*** (0.077) -0.211*** (0.068) 
Years schooling   0.027** (0.013)   0.042* (0.025) 
Potential experience   0.039*** (0.006)   0.065*** (0.014) 
Female   -0.201*** (0.035)   -0.256*** (0.069) 
Child   0.255*** (0.065)     
Child*Female   -0.135* (0.075)     
Married   -0.153*** (0.058)     
Ln hh income per capita   0.037** (0.017)     
Previous job-training 
course   0.011 (0.034)   -0.016 (0.070) 
Tenure       0.001 (0.001) 
Commerce sector       -0.08 (0.080) 
Manufacturing sector       -0.042 (0.086) 
Micro enterprise       -0.561*** (0.066) 
Arequipa   0.206*** (0.041)   -0.536*** (0.094) 
Chiclayo   0.031 (0.053)   -0.161 (0.110) 
Cusco   0.047 (0.046)   -0.063 (0.131) 
Trujillo   0.059 (0.043)   0.027 (0.087) 
Constant 0.603*** (0.028) 0.076 (0.163) 4.932*** (0.066) 4.867*** (0.298) 
Number of observations 2006 2006 1182 1126 
Wald test F(1, 1501) = 0.00 F(13, 1501) = 14.10 F(1, 894) = 9.89 F(13, 846) = 26.65 
R-squared 0.000 0.1191 0.017 0.2921 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Robust standard errors adjusted. 
Base category for city dummies: Lima. 
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Table A5. 
Rosenbaum (1995) sensitivity analysis for Projoven sixth Public Call effect on employment [6 
months after training]. Range of significance levels for hidden biases of various magnitudes. 
  Minimum Maximum 
   
1 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
2 < 0.0001 0.0078 
3 < 0.0001 0.6848 
4 < 0.0001 0.9924 
5 < 0.0001 0.9999 
 
Values of   close to 1 could lead to inferences that differ significantly from those 
obtained assuming the study is free of hidden bias. A study is insensitive if 
extreme values of   are required to alter the inference. 
 
Table A4 gives the sensitivity analysis for Projoven sixth Public Call. For five 
values of  , the table gives the upper and lower bounds on the significance level. 
If 2 , one person in a pair may be two times as likely to undertake training as 
the other because they have different values of the unobserved covariate r . In 
the case 2 , the significance level might be less than 0.0001 or it might be as 
high as 0.0078, but for all Rr , the null hypothesis of no effect of training on 
employment is not plausible. The null hypothesis of no effect begins to become 
plausible for at least some Rr  with 3 . To attribute the higher employment 
rate to an unobservable covariate rather than to an effect of training, that 
unobserved covariate would need to produce a threefold increase in the odds of 
undertaking training, and it would need to be a near-perfect predictor of 
employment. Consequently, the association between training and employment 
cannot be attributed to small hidden biases, but is somewhat more sensitive to 
bias than examples provided in Rosenbaum (1995).21 
                                                 
21
 Rosenbaum (1995) considers a high degree of insensitivity to hidden bias when the null hypothesis of no 
effect begins to become plausible for at least 5 . 
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Table A6. 
OLS estimates. Instruments relevance test [only trainees sample]. 
 
Dep. var. ov. 
employment 
Dep. var. ln monthly 
wages 
 Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
Type of Ecap      
Centres for vocational training [CEO] 0.026 (0.052) 0.124 (0.126) 
Firms -0.071 (0.082) -0.034 (0.211) 
Institutes for tertiary technical education [IST] 0.142 (0.097) -0.290** (0.184) 
NGO 0.019 (0.051) -0.065 (0.123) 
Vocational centres sponsored by guilds [Guilds] -0.003 (0.053) 0.07 (0.126) 
University -0.079 (0.060) -0.116 (0.146) 
Constant 0.648*** (0.050) 5.409*** (0.120) 
Number of observations 4056 2500 
F-test F(6, 4049) = 5.59 F(6, 2493) = 7.46 
R2 0.0067 0.0153 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Base category for ECAP-type dummies: others (high schools, churches, etc.). 
Robust standard errors. 
 
 
 
Table A7. 
OLS estimates. Instruments relevance test [only trainees placed in internship sample]. 
 
Dep. var. ov. 
employment 
Dep. var. ln monthly 
wages 
 Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
Type of Ecap      
Centres for vocational training [CEO] -0.024 (0.067) 0.169 (0.154) 
Firms -0.115 (0.092) -0.006 (0.227) 
Institutes for tertiary technical education [IST] 0.091 (0.075) -0.265 (0.170) 
NGO -0.001 (0.066) 0.024 (0.151) 
Vocational centres sponsored by guilds [Guilds] -0.04 (0.068) 0.114 (0.157) 
University -0.151** (0.076) -0.056 (0.179) 
Constant 0.692*** (0.065) 5.381*** (0.148) 
Number of observations 2832 1772 
F-test F(6, 2825) = 4.14 F(6, 1765) = 4.32 
R2 0.0087 0.0145 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Base category for ECAP-type dummies: others (high schools, churches, etc.). 
Robust standard errors. 
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Table A8. 
LPM-FE estimates Projoven sixth Public Call participation effects on overall employment. 
Heterogeneous effects over time. 
 
[G2] vs. [G1] 
 
[G3] vs. [G1] 
 
[G4] vs. [G1] 
 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Projoven 0.033 (0.059) -0.006 (0.054) 0.091** (0.044) 
Projoven [12 months] -0.036 (0.051) -0.068 (0.045) -0.105*** (0.036) 
Projoven [18 months] -0.069 (0.056) -0.018 (0.054) -0.125*** (0.043) 
Years schooling -0.014 (0.044) -0.028 (0.044) -0.027 (0.041) 
Potential experience -0.028 (0.035) -0.027 (0.035) -0.027 (0.035) 
Child 0.013 (0.088) -0.042 (0.088) -0.059 (0.075) 
Child*Female -0.042 (0.115) -0.032 (0.116) -0.011 (0.097) 
Married -0.061 (0.045) -0.047 (0.044) -0.049 (0.039) 
Ln hh income per capita -0.013** (0.005) -0.014*** (0.005) -0.014*** (0.004) 
Previous job-training 
course -0.055* (0.031) -0.067** (0.030) -0.037 (0.025) 
Constant 0.914 (0.575) 1.078* (0.574) 1.068** (0.537) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes 
Number of observations 4724 4827 6257 
Number of individuals 1186 1212 1570 
F-test F(12,681) = 8.71 F(12,707) = 10.65 F(12,1065) = 12.33 
R-squared 0.071 0.0766 0.0632 
  iti Xcorr ,  -0.218 -0.2292 -0.2435 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Clustered robust standard errors. 
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Table A9. 
LPM-FE estimates Projoven sixth Public Call internship placement effects on overall 
employment. Heterogeneous effects over time [only trainees sample]. 
 
[G3] vs. [G2] [G4] vs. [G2] 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
     
Internship -0.041 (0.062) 0.055 (0.054) 
Internship [12 months] -0.033 (0.056) -0.063 (0.048) 
Internship [18 months] 0.051 (0.057) -0.049 (0.048) 
Years schooling 0.060 (0.051) 0.033 (0.049) 
Potential experience 0.002 (0.047) 0.009 (0.047) 
Child 0.150 (0.100) 0.042 (0.065) 
Child*Female -0.277* (0.155) -0.123 (0.092) 
Married -0.211*** (0.066) -0.141*** (0.051) 
Ln hh income per capita -0.016** (0.008) -0.015*** (0.004) 
Previous job-training 
course -0.129*** (0.037) -0.040 (0.026) 
Constant 0.086 (0.683) 0.332 (0.665) 
Time Dummies yes yes 
Number of observations 1653 3083 
Number of individuals 414 772 
F-test F(12,413) = 9.60 F(12,771) = 9.91 
R-squared 0.077 0.0451 
  iti Xcorr ,  -0.1813 -0.019 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
SSC stands for sample selection correction. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors adjusted for ECAPs clusters. The standard errors should be interpreted as 
asymptotic lower bounds. 
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Table A10. 
FE estimates [with sample selection correction – Wooldridge, 1995] Projoven sixth Public Call 
internship completion effects. Heterogeneous treatment over time [only trainees placed in 
internships sample] [G4] vs. [G3]. 
 
Dep. var. ov. 
employment [LPM] 
 
Dep. var. formal 
employment [LPM 
with SSC] 
Dep. var. ln monthly 
wages [with SSC] 
 
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
       
Internship Completion 0.103* (0.061) 0.187* (0.097) 0.351** (0.139) 
Internship Completion * [12 months] -0.014 (0.051) -0.014 (0.077) -0.263** (0.110) 
Internship Completion * [18 months] -0.109* (0.059) -0.029 (0.071) -0.354*** (0.112) 
Years schooling -0.031 (0.058) -0.068 (0.102) 0.22 (0.150) 
Potential experience -0.035 (0.055) -0.053 (0.096) 0.217 (0.143) 
Child -0.1 (0.066) 0.110 (0.100)   
Child*Female -0.067 (0.088) -0.170 (0.141)   
Married -0.093* (0.053) 0.029 (0.070)   
Ln hh income per capita -0.017*** (0.004) 0.002 (0.007)   
Previous job-training course -0.050* (0.027) 0.002 (0.035) -0.145*** (0.054) 
Commerce sector   -0.025 (0.043) -0.079 (0.071) 
Manufacturing sector   0.081** (0.041) 0.01 (0.062) 
Micro enterprise   -0.140*** (0.031) -0.443*** (0.051) 
Constant 1.163 (0.776) 1.506 (1.382) 2.067 (2.054) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes 
SSC terms no yes yes 
Number of observations 2827 1908 1772 
Number of individuals 708 679 646 
Overall F-test F(12, 2815) = 10.27 F(19, 1888) = 3.56 F(15, 1757) = 27.70 
F-Test SSC terms  F(4, 678) = 1.50 F(4, 645) = 15.06 
p-value  0.2004 0.000 
R-squared 0.0512 0.0573 0.3755 
  iti Xcorr ,  -0.389 -0.3779 -0.4174 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
SSC stands for sample selection correction. 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01 and May-
02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after Projoven, 
and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are Nov-99 and 
May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors adjusted for ECAPs clusters. The standard errors should be interpreted as 
asymptotic lower bounds. 
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Table A11. 
LPM-FE estimates [corrected for sample selection – Wooldridge, 1995] Projoven sixth Public 
Call participation effects on formal employment. Heterogeneous effects over time. 
 
[G2], [G3] and 
[G4] vs. [G1] 
[G2] vs. [G1] 
 
[G3] vs. [G1] 
 
[G4] vs. [G1] 
 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
         
Projoven 0.028 (0.059) -0.046 (0.085) 0.012 (0.075) 0.081 (0.065) 
Projoven [12 months] -0.006 (0.043) -0.020 (0.070) -0.011 (0.055) -0.010 (0.047) 
Projoven [18 months] -0.081* (0.046) -0.123* (0.069) -0.078 (0.058) -0.071 (0.049) 
Years schooling 0.085 (0.065) 0.084 (0.079) 0.078 (0.050) 0.076 (0.070) 
Potential experience 0.075 (0.058) 0.068 (0.066) 0.046* (0.028) 0.076 (0.061) 
Child 0.061 (0.067) 0.068 (0.090) 0.068 (0.090) 0.070 (0.080) 
Child*Female -0.155* (0.088) -0.213* (0.114) -0.182 (0.115) -0.218** (0.097) 
Married 0.012 (0.048) -0.018 (0.069) -0.009 (0.065) 0.009 (0.055) 
Ln hh income per capita 0.000 (0.006) -0.002 (0.009) 0.000 (0.008) -0.002 (0.006) 
Previous job-training course -0.043 (0.033) -0.069 (0.050) -0.051 (0.050) -0.064* (0.038) 
Commerce sector 0.043 (0.033) 0.079* (0.046) 0.041 (0.045) 0.043 (0.038) 
Manufacturing sector 0.021 (0.036) -0.024 (0.057) -0.063 (0.056) 0.011 (0.043) 
Micro enterprise -0.050* (0.027) 0.013 (0.043) 0.001 (0.043) -0.033 (0.032) 
Constant -0.565 (0.878) -0.561 (1.056) -0.409 (0.609) -0.484 (0.949) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes 
SSC terms yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 5279 3118 3183 4232 
Number of individuals 1908 1141 1172 1521 
Overall F-test F(19,1435) = 2.57 F(19,647) = 2.89 F(18,678) = 1.92 F(19, 1027) = 2.54 
F-test SSC terms F(4, 1435) = 2.28 F(4, 647) = 2.13  F(4, 678) = 2.66 F(4, 1027) = 1.34 
p-value 0.0588 0.0761 0.032 0.2532 
R-squared 0.0297 0.0437 0.0402 0.0375 
  iti Xcorr ,  -0.3616 -0.3393 -0.244 -0.3868 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
SSC stands for sample selection correction. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Clustered robust standard errors. The standard errors should be interpreted as asymptotic lower 
bounds. 
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Table A12. 
LPM-FE estimates [corrected for sample selection – Wooldridge, 1995] Projoven sixth Public 
Call internship effects on formal employment. Heterogeneous effects over time [only trainees 
sample]. 
 
[G3] vs. [G2] [G4] vs. [G2] 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
     
Internship 0.032 (0.094) 0.092 (0.076) 
Internship [12 months] 0.031 (0.077) 0.048 (0.067) 
Internship [18 months] 0.036 (0.074) 0.067 (0.063) 
Years schooling 0.083 (0.087) 0.062 (0.079) 
Potential experience 0.032 (0.082) 0.072 (0.075) 
Child 0.058 (0.124) 0.043 (0.091) 
Child*Female 0.175 (0.175) -0.116 (0.134) 
Married -0.04 (0.095) 0.033 (0.069) 
Ln hh income per capita 0.004 (0.011) -0.001 (0.007) 
Previous job-training 
course 0.048 (0.050) -0.029 (0.034) 
Commerce sector 0.046 (0.058) 0.025 (0.042) 
Manufacturing sector 0.059 (0.057) 0.100*** (0.039) 
Micro enterprise -0.115*** (0.044) -0.121*** (0.030) 
Constant -0.409 (1.201) -0.289 (1.078) 
Time Dummies yes yes 
SSC terms yes yes 
Number of observations 1047 2096 
Number of individuals 387 736 
Overall F-test F(19,386) = 1.58 F(19,735) = 3.49 
F-test SSC terms F(4, 386) = 2.90 F(4, 735) = 2.09 
p-value 0.022 0.0799 
R-squared 0.0438 0.0524 
  iti Xcorr ,  -0.132 -0.3913 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
SSC stands for Sample selection correction. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors adjusted for ECAPs clusters. The standard errors should be interpreted as 
asymptotic lower bounds. 
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Table A13. 
FE estimates [with sample selection correction – Wooldridge, 1995] Projoven sixth Public Call 
participation effects on monthly wages. Heterogeneous effects over time. 
 
[G2], [G3] and 
[G4] vs. [G1] 
[G2] vs. [G1] 
 
[G3] vs. [G1] 
 
[G4] vs. [G1] 
 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
         
Projoven 0.363*** (0.087) 0.332 (0.135) 0.341*** (0.124) 0.382*** (0.095) 
Projoven [12 months] -0.071 (0.059) -0.025 (0.096) 0.106 (0.084) -0.140** (0.063) 
Projoven [18 months] -0.002 (0.063) 0.105 (0.098) 0.126 (0.095) -0.089 (0.066) 
Years schooling 0.172* (0.093) 0.162 (0.109) 0.200* (0.109) 0.177* (0.104) 
Potential experience 0.175** (0.084) 0.176 (0.091) 0.190** (0.091) 0.193** (0.094) 
Previous job-training course -0.100** (0.048) -0.061 (0.075) -0.074 (0.075) -0.091 (0.058) 
Commerce sector -0.036 (0.057) -0.035 (0.085) 0.015 (0.085) -0.016 (0.071) 
Manufacturing sector 0.071 (0.049) 0.113 (0.078) 0.105 (0.076) 0.113* (0.059) 
Micro enterprise 
-
0.296*** (0.044) -0.206 (0.068) -0.198*** (0.069) -0.300*** (0.054) 
Constant 2.627** (1.267) 2.710 (1.461) 2.229 (1.459) 2.504* (1.442) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes 
SSC terms yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 4802 2808 2845 3847 
Number of individuals 1748 1023 1042 1389 
Overall F-test F(15,1335) = 42.00 F(15,590) = 14.39 F(15,609) = 15.65 F(15,956) = 25.87 
F-test SSC terms  F(4, 1335) = 24.82 F(4, 590) = 13.57  F(4, 609) = 14.67 F(4, 956) = 18.29 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.2881 0.2274 0.2307 0.272 
  iti Xcorr ,  -0.3094 -0.33 -0.3783 -0.3627 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
SSC stands for sample selection correction. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Clustered robust standard errors. The standard errors should be interpreted as asymptotic lower 
bounds. 
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Table A14. 
FE estimates [with sample selection correction – Wooldridge, 1995] Projoven sixth Public Call 
internship placement effects on monthly wages. Heterogeneous treatment over time [only 
trainees sample]. 
 
[G3] vs. [G2] [G4] vs. [G2] 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
     
Internship 0.087 (0.143) 0.109 (0.124) 
Internship [12 months] 0.073 (0.109) -0.163* (0.088) 
Internship [18 months] -0.017 (0.109) -0.268*** (0.090) 
Years schooling 0.515*** (0.141) 0.453*** (0.131) 
Potential experience 0.474*** (0.132) 0.471*** (0.125) 
Previous job-training course -0.112 (0.073) -0.128** (0.052) 
Commerce sector -0.163** (0.078) -0.134** (0.066) 
Manufacturing sector -0.108 (0.082) 0.007 (0.059) 
Micro enterprise -0.272*** (0.065) -0.401*** (0.049) 
Constant -2.043 (1.907) -1.288 (1.803) 
Time Dummies Yes yes 
SSC terms Yes yes 
Number of observations 955 1957 
Number of individuals 359 706 
Overall F- test F(15,358) = 20.19 F(15,705) = 30.09 
F-test SSC terms F(4, 358) = 9.95 F(4, 705) = 17.11 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.3838 0.370 
  iti Xcorr ,  -0.808 -0.7976 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
SSC stands for sample selection correction. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors adjusted for ECAPs clusters. The standard errors should be interpreted as 
asymptotic lower bounds. 
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Table A15. 
Pooled two-stage least squares with sample selection correction estimation of Projoven sixth 
Public Call internship placement effects. Endogenous and heterogeneous treatment over time 
[only trainees sample] [G3] vs. [G2]. 
 
Dep. var. ov. 
employment [LPM] [1] 
Dep. var. formal 
employment [LPM] [2] 
Dep. var. ln monthly 
wages [3] 
 Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
       
Internship placement 0.134 (0.401) 0.632 (0.510) -0.277 (0.764) 
Internship placement * [12 months] 0.196 (0.423) -0.104 (0.558) 0.692 (0.790) 
Internship placement * [18 months] 0.075 (0.408) -0.264 (0.510) -0.007 (0.746) 
Years schooling -0.05 (0.213) -0.281 (0.192) 0.831*** (0.281) 
Potential experience -0.086 (0.216) -0.261 (0.198) 0.785*** (0.290) 
Female -0.090*** (0.027) 0.019 (0.032) -0.226*** (0.054) 
Child 0.125 (0.085)     
Child*Female -0.226*** (0.070)     
Married -0.212*** (0.072)     
Ln hh income per capita -0.016 (0.010)     
Previous job-training course -0.113*** (0.041) 0.015 (0.052) -0.038 (0.077) 
Arequipa 0.134*** (0.031) 0.375*** (0.063) -0.559*** (0.102) 
Chiclayo -0.02 (0.043) 0.436*** (0.062) -0.172* (0.103) 
Cusco 0.211* (0.110) 0.263*** (0.090) 0.017 (0.156) 
Trujillo -0.066 (0.075) 0.263*** (0.090) -0.328** (0.138) 
Commerce sector   0.050 (0.038) -0.068 (0.062) 
Manufacturing sector   0.035 (0.038) 0.02 (0.061) 
Micro enterprise   -0.127*** (0.036) -0.438*** (0.057) 
Constant 0.580* (0.342) -0.252 (0.304 6.177*** (0.477) 
Mundlak terms yes yes yes 
Time Dummies yes yes yes 
SSC terms no yes yes 
Number of observations 1653 1048 985 
Overall F- test F(23, 1629) = 13.09 F(26, 1021) = 12.11 F(26, 958) = 23.16 
Wald Test SSC terms n. a.   
2
4  =  6.46  
2
4  = 4.07 
p-value n. a.  0.1671 0.3971 
Sargan test  
2
3 = 3.840  
2
3 = 4.664  
2
3  = 6.829 
p-value 0.2792 0.1981 0.0776 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
SSC stands for sample selection correction. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors adjusted for ECAPs clusters. The standard errors should be interpreted as 
asymptotic lower bounds. 
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Table A16. 
Pooled two-stage least squares with sample selection correction estimation of Projoven sixth 
Public Call internship placement effects. Endogenous and heterogeneous treatment over time 
[only trainees sample] [G4] vs. [G2]. 
 
Dep. var. ov. 
employment [LPM] [1] 
Dep. var. formal 
employment [LPM] [2] 
Dep. var. ln monthly 
wages [3] 
 Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
       
Internship placement 0.255 (0.184) 0.747 (0.781) 0.652 (1.109) 
Internship placement * [12 months] -0.115 (0.201) 0.039 (0.752) 0.502 (1.067) 
Internship placement * [18 months] -0.137 (0.195) -0.388 (0.745) -0.271 (1.053) 
Years schooling -0.124 (0.139) -0.22 (0.278) 0.388 (0.385) 
Potential experience -0.139 (0.140) -0.223 (0.288) 0.371 (0.400) 
Female -0.097*** (0.019) 0.02 (0.034) -0.141** (0.055) 
Child 0.087 (0.058)     
Child*Female -0.231*** (0.044)     
Married -0.133*** (0.049)     
Ln hh income per capita -0.013*** (0.004)     
Previous job-training course -0.037 (0.027) 0.001 (0.041) 0.018 (0.069) 
Arequipa 0.107*** (0.023) 0.325*** (0.059) -0.646*** (0.096) 
Chiclayo -0.042 (0.042) 0.346*** (0.059) -0.042 (0.099) 
Cusco 0.058** (0.025) 0.038 (0.049) -0.039 (0.070) 
Trujillo -0.099*** (0.024) 0.106*** (0.037) -0.161*** (0.056) 
Commerce sector a  0.032 (0.029) -0.043 (0.050) 
Manufacturing sector a  0.035 (0.029) 0.043 (0.048) 
Micro enterprise a  -0.126*** (0.023) -0.515*** (0.040) 
Constant 0.558*** (0.201) -0.232 (0.406) 5.783*** (0.574) 
Mundlak terms yes yes yes 
Time Dummies yes yes yes 
SSC terms no yes yes 
Number of observations 3083 2097 2041 
Overall F-test F(23,  3059) = 21.81 F(26, 2070) = 20.89 F(26, 2014) = 37.08 
Wald Test SSC terms n. a.   
2
3  = 4.82  
2
3  = 7.63 
p-value n. a.  0.3064 0.106 
Sargan test  
2
3  =  8.329  
2
3  = 1.225  
2
3  =  3.255 
p-value 0.0397 0.7471 0.3539 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
SSC stands for sample selection correction. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors adjusted for ECAPs clusters. The standard errors should be interpreted as 
asymptotic lower bounds. 
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Table A17. 
Pooled two-stage least squares with sample selection correction estimation of Projoven sixth 
Public Call internship completion effects. Heterogeneous treatment over time [only trainees 
placed in internships sample] [G4] vs. [G3]. 
 
Dep. var. ov. 
employment [LPM] [1] 
Dep. var. formal 
employment [LPM] [2] 
Dep. var. ln monthly 
wages [3] 
 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
Coef. Std. 
err. 
       
Internship Completion 0.245* (0.130) 0.442*** (0.166) 1.051* (0.625) 
Internship Completion * [12 months] -0.131 (0.143) -0.009 (0.152) -0.714 (0.508) 
Internship Completion * [18 months] 0.010 (0.134) -0.292 (0.255) -0.622 (0.605) 
Years schooling -0.158 (0.126) -0.187 (0.192) -0.348 (0.603) 
Potential experience -0.151 (0.121) -0.19 (0.176) -0.357 (0.581) 
Female -0.097*** (0.021) -0.026 (0.022) -0.188*** (0.067) 
Child -0.013 (0.051)     
Child*Female -0.238*** (0.045)     
Married -0.087 (0.056)     
Ln hh income per capita -0.016*** (0.004)     
Previous job-training course -0.051 (0.033) -0.034 (0.032) -0.058 (0.058) 
Arequipa 0.092*** (0.029) 0.370*** (0.039) -0.637*** (0.120) 
Chiclayo -0.041 (0.040) 0.362*** (0.044) -0.07 (0.090) 
Cusco 0.019 (0.032) 0.037 (0.059) -0.135 (0.093) 
Trujillo -0.112*** (0.041) 0.053 (0.045) -0.233** (0.105) 
Commerce sector a  0.01 (0.033) -0.007 (0.067) 
Manufacturing sector a  0.011 (0.037) 0.058 (0.058) 
Micro enterprise a  -0.152*** (0.028) -0.548*** (0.053) 
Constant 0.606*** (0.163) 0.053 (0.288) 5.416*** (0.687) 
Mundlak terms yes yes yes 
Time Dummies yes yes yes 
SSC terms no yes yes 
Number of observations 1489 914 815 
Overall F-test F(23, 38) = 129.80 F(26, 38) = 113.26 F(26, 38) = 89.19 
Wald Test SSC terms n. a.   
2
4 = 6.96  
2
4 = 14.37 
p-value n. a.  0.138 0.0062 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
SSC stands for sample selection correction. 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors adjusted for ECAPs clusters. The standard errors should be interpreted as 
asymptotic lower bounds. 
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Table A18. 
LPM-RE estimates Projoven sixth Public Call participation effects on overall employment. 
Heterogeneous effects over time and across individual characteristics. 
 
[G2] vs. [G1] [G3] vs. [G1] [G4] vs. [G1] 
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
       
Projoven*Female -0.079 (0.067) -0.114* (0.065) -0.069* (0.039) 
Projoven*No work experience 0.167** (0.068) 0.148** (0.068) 0.243*** (0.048) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile -0.013 (0.077) 0.012 (0.071) 0.029 (0.052) 
Projoven*Female*[12 months] 0.084 (0.073) 0.100 (0.067) -0.013 (0.041) 
Projoven*No work experience*[12 months] -0.01 (0.079) -0.074 (0.068) -0.043 (0.047) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile*[12 months] -0.052 (0.083) -0.026 (0.068) 0.023 (0.052) 
Projoven*Female*[18 months] 0.011 (0.077) 0.084 (0.070) 0.000 (0.046) 
Projoven*No work experience*[18 months] 0.003 (0.082) 0.085 (0.076) 0.093* (0.050) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile*[18 months] -0.01 (0.084) -0.055 (0.080) 0.007 (0.053) 
Female -0.050* (0.029) -0.048* (0.028) -0.046* (0.026) 
No work experience -0.373*** (0.030) -0.374*** (0.030) -0.391*** (0.027) 
Lowest quartile -0.064* (0.033) -0.055* (0.033) -0.055* (0.031) 
Constant 0.181*** (0.021) 0.177*** (0.021) 0.165*** (0.017) 
Time Dummies Yes yes yes 
Number of observations 2571 2626 3434 
Number of individuals 645 659 861 
Wald test  
2
14  = 263.51  
2
14  = 268.74  
2
14 = 345.39 
R-squared 0.3307 0.323 0.2901 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Clustered robust standard errors. 
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Table A19. 
LPM-RE estimates Projoven sixth Public Call internship placement effects on overall 
employment. Heterogeneous effects over time and across individual characteristics [only 
trainees sample]. 
 
[G3] vs. [G2] [G4] vs. [G2] 
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
     
Internship*Female -0.095 (0.065) -0.049 (0.039) 
Internship*No work experience 0.108 (0.068) 0.241*** (0.048) 
Internship*Lowest quartile 0.009 (0.069) 0.014 (0.051) 
Internship*Female*[12 months] 0.102 (0.067) 0.000 (0.042) 
Internship*No work experience*[12 months] -0.067 (0.069) -0.038 (0.048) 
Internship*Lowest quartile*[12 months] -0.020 (0.068) 0.027 (0.052) 
Internship*Female*[18 months] 0.106 (0.070) 0.041 (0.045) 
Internship*No work experience*[18 months] 0.105 (0.076) 0.106** (0.050) 
Internship*Lowest quartile*[18 months] -0.032 (0.079) 0.018 (0.053) 
Female -0.036 (0.032) -0.045* (0.025) 
No work experience -0.315*** (0.034) -0.360*** (0.028) 
Lowest quartile -0.029 (0.035) -0.047 (0.029) 
Constant 0.164*** (0.024) 0.145*** (0.017) 
Time Dummies yes yes 
Number of observations 821 1629 
Number of individuals 206 408 
Wald test  
2
14  = 118.23  
2
14  = 221.66 
R-squared 0.2024 0.1729 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors adjusted for ECAPs clusters. 
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Table A20. 
LPM-RE estimates [with sample selection correction – Wooldridge, 1995] Projoven sixth Public 
Call participation effects on formal employment. Heterogeneous effects over time and across 
individual characteristics.  
 
[G2] vs. [G1] [G3] vs. [G1] [G4] vs. [G1] 
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
       
Projoven*Female -0.105 (0.086) -0.099 (0.087) -0.059 (0.047) 
Projoven*No work experience 0.021 (0.097) -0.062 (0.098) 0.094 (0.065) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile 0.031 (0.103) 0.159* (0.088) -0.042 (0.065) 
Projoven*Female*[12 months] 0.008 (0.102) 0.111 (0.097) 0.024 (0.052) 
Projoven*No work experience*[12 months] -0.090 (0.107) -0.190* (0.099) -0.091 (0.063) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile*[12 months] 0.003 (0.108) -0.022 (0.102) 0.059 (0.063) 
Projoven*Female*[18 months] 0.046 (0.098) 0.068 (0.086) -0.011 (0.052) 
Projoven*No work experience*[18 months] 0.089 (0.102) 0.034 (0.095) -0.064 (0.063) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile*[18 months] 0.003 (0.106) -0.08 (0.078) 0.02 (0.066) 
Female 0.108*** (0.040) 0.091** (0.040) 0.114*** (0.035) 
No work experience 0.069 (0.046) 0.047 (0.044) 0.048 (0.042) 
Lowest quartile 0.105** (0.042) 0.072* (0.041) 0.085** (0.038) 
Constant -0.094*** (0.033) -0.064** (0.032) -0.086*** (0.025) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes 
Number of observations 1538 1559 2110 
Number of individuals 614 633 828 
Overall Wald test  
2
14  = 37.86  
2
14   = 34.22  
2
14  = 40.54 
R-squared 0.0644 0.0479 0.0495 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Clustered robust standard errors. 
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Table A21. 
RE estimates [with sample selection correction – Wooldridge, 1995] Projoven sixth Public Call 
participation effects on monthly wages. Heterogeneous effects over time and across individual 
characteristics. 
 
[G2] vs. [G1] [G3] vs. [G1] [G4] vs. [G1] 
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
       
Projoven*Female -0.151 (0.182) 0.000 (0.152) -0.108 (0.092) 
Projoven*No work experience -0.241 (0.166) -0.209 (0.177) 0.193 (0.126) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile 0.363* (0.208) 0.040 (0.187) 0.215* (0.117) 
Projoven*Female*[12 months] -0.115 (0.147) -0.221* (0.122) -0.061 (0.066) 
Projoven*No work experience*[12 months] -0.03 (0.134) 0.228* (0.137) -0.023 (0.080) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile*[12 months] 0.142 (0.161) 0.089 (0.126) 0.074 (0.085) 
Projoven*Female*[18 months] -0.146 (0.155) -0.168 (0.123) 0.085 (0.067) 
Projoven*No work experience*[18 months] 0.312** (0.138) 0.211 (0.168) -0.001 (0.080) 
Projoven*Lowest quartile*[18 months] -0.054 (0.155) 0.061 (0.172) -0.047 (0.084) 
Female -0.262** (0.125) -0.261** (0.125) -0.190* (0.106) 
No work experience 0.352*** (0.131) 0.303** (0.131) 0.245** (0.118) 
Lowest quartile 0.095 (0.131) 0.132 (0.130) -0.041 (0.116) 
Constant 0.050 (0.078) 0.061 (0.077) 0.057 (0.061) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes 
Number of observations 1303 1298 1814 
Number of individuals 528 536 732 
Overall Wald test  
2
14  = 40.78  
2
14  = 20.25  
2
14  = 35.99 
R-squared 0.0366 0.0336 0.0141 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Clustered robust standard errors. 
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Table A22. 
LPM-RE estimates [with sample selection correction – Wooldridge, 1995] Projoven sixth Public 
Call internship effects on formal employment. Heterogeneous effects over time and across 
individual characteristics [only trainees sample]. 
 
[G3] vs. [G2] [G4] vs. [G2] 
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
     
Internship*Female -0.084 (0.091) -0.058 (0.049) 
Internship*No work experience -0.059 (0.102) 0.118* (0.067) 
Internship*Lowest quartile 0.128 (0.097) -0.058 (0.071) 
Internship*Female*[12 months] 0.104 (0.095) 0.009 (0.053) 
Internship*No work experience*[12 months] -0.153 (0.101) -0.099 (0.063) 
Internship*Lowest quartile*[12 months] -0.064 (0.103) 0.053 (0.065) 
Internship*Female*[18 months] 0.049 (0.088) -0.026 (0.052) 
Internship*No work experience*[18 months] 0.025 (0.097) -0.071 (0.062) 
Internship*Lowest quartile*[18 months] -0.126 (0.080) -0.007 (0.067) 
Female -0.006 (0.045) 0.084** (0.037) 
No work experience 0.032 (0.049) 0.032 (0.046) 
Lowest quartile 0.101** (0.049) 0.099** (0.045) 
Constant -0.021 (0.034) -0.068*** (0.024) 
Time Dummies yes yes 
Number of observations 465 1016 
Number of individuals 187 382 
Overall Wald test  
2
14  = 21.76  
2
14  = 29.58 
R-squared 0.0317 0.0286 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors adjusted for ECAPs clusters. 
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Table A23. 
RE estimates [with sample selection correction – Wooldridge, 1995] Projoven sixth Public Call 
internship placement effects on monthly wages. Heterogeneous treatment over time and 
across individual characteristics [only trainees sample]. 
 
[G3] vs. [G2] [G4] vs. [G2] 
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
     
Internship*Female 0.010 (0.158) -0.124 (0.100) 
Internship*No work experience -0.110 (0.198) 0.353*** (0.133) 
Internship*Lowest quartile 0.193 (0.203) 0.482*** (0.126) 
Internship*Female*[12 months] -0.189 (0.124) -0.006 (0.067) 
Internship*No work experience*[12 months] 0.268* (0.141) -0.002 (0.082) 
Internship*Lowest quartile*[12 months] 0.033 (0.124) 0.078 (0.089) 
Internship*Female*[18 months] -0.175 (0.127) 0.140** (0.068) 
Internship*No work experience*[18 months] 0.222 (0.180) 0.042 (0.081) 
Internship*Lowest quartile*[18 months] 0.020 (0.169) -0.041 (0.089) 
Female -0.477*** (0.140) -0.239** (0.107) 
No work experience 0.365** (0.146) 0.18 (0.130) 
Lowest quartile -0.110 (0.158) -0.482*** (0.128) 
Constant 0.150 (0.101) 0.121* (0.069) 
Time Dummies yes yes 
Number of observations 405 921 
Number of individuals 166 362 
Overall Wald test  
2
14  = 37.33   
2
14  = 72.25 
R-squared 0.0548 0.0300 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
Robust standard errors adjusted for ECAPs clusters. 
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Table A24. 
RE estimates [with sample selection correction] Projoven sixth Public Call internship 
completion effects. Heterogeneous treatment over time [only trainees placed in internships 
sample] [G4] vs. [G3]. 
 
Dep. var. ov. 
employment 
Dep. var. formal 
employment 
Dep. var. monthly 
wages 
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
       
Internship Completion*Female -0.051 (0.041) -0.092* (0.052) -0.140 (0.094) 
Internship Completion*No work experience 0.282*** (0.050) 0.085 (0.074) 0.370*** (0.119) 
Internship Completion*Lowest quartile 0.017 (0.055) 0.009 (0.076) 0.422*** (0.119) 
Internship Completion*Female*[12 months] 0.01 (0.042) 0.025 (0.053) -0.042 (0.068) 
Internship Completion*No work experience*[12 months] -0.034 (0.048) -0.103 (0.063) -0.015 (0.084) 
Internship Completion*Lowest quartile*[12 months] 0.031 (0.052) 0.046 (0.063) 0.098 (0.090) 
Internship Completion*Female*[18 months] 0.056 (0.046) -0.033 (0.053) 0.137** (0.068) 
Internship Completion*No work experience*[18 months] 0.118** (0.050) -0.078 (0.061) 0.023 (0.081) 
Internship Completion*Lowest quartile*[18 months] 0.03 (0.053) 0.002 (0.066) -0.025 (0.089) 
Female -0.061** (0.030) 0.103** (0.043) -0.181** (0.086) 
No work experience -0.443*** (0.032) -0.055 (0.057) -0.167 (0.102) 
Lowest quartile -0.047 (0.037) 0.071 (0.054) -0.489*** (0.104) 
Constant 0.175*** (0.020) -0.037 (0.026) 0.162*** (0.044) 
Time Dummies yes yes Yes 
Number of observations 2827 1908 1772 
Number of individuals 708 679 646 
Overall Wald test  
2
14  = 263.49  
2
14  = 20.38  
2
14  =  77.01 
R-squared 0.1862 0.0219 0.041 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
The time dimension of the panel consists of four time periods: Nov-99, May-01, Nov-01, and 
May-02. This represents baseline before Projoven, 6 months after Projoven, 12 months after 
Projoven, and 18 months after Projoven, respectively. In all the models, the base periods are Nov-
99 and May-01. Two base periods are chosen, as the treatment variable takes the value zero for all 
individuals (treatment and controls) before the programme (Nov-99). 
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Table A25. 
Linear probability model – pooled two-stage least squares estimates [without Mundlak terms]. 
Projoven sixth Public Call effects on overall employment by level of completion. 
Heterogeneous treatment over time and endogenous treatment. 
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 
12 months 
[ 2ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 
18 months 
[ 3ˆ ] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.121 0.213 0.078 
 (0.424) (0.437) (0.418) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.290 -0.148 -0.170 
 (0.184) (0.201) (0.194) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion 
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.280** -0.161 -0.023 
 (0.137) (0.150) (0.138) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table A26. 
Linear probability model – pooled two-stage least squares estimates [using initial values of the 
time-varying regressors as Mundlak terms]. Projoven sixth Public Call effects on overall 
employment by level of completion. Heterogeneous treatment over time and endogenous 
treatment. 
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 
12 months 
[ 2ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 18 
months 
[ 3ˆ ] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.142 0.194 0.062 
 (0.396) (0.423) (0.405) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.266 -0.133 -0.153 
 (0.186) (0.202) (0.195) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion 
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.272** -0.157 -0.006 
 (0.135) (0.136) (0.134) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A27. 
Linear probability model – pooled two-stage least squares estimates with sample selection 
correction (Semykina and Wooldridge, 2006) [without Mundlak terms]. Projoven sixth Public 
Call effects on formal employment by level of completion. Heterogeneous treatment over time 
and endogenous treatment. 
 
Effects after 
6 months 
[ 1ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 12 
months 
[ 2ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 
18 months 
[ 3ˆ ] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement  
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.487 -0.057 -0.115 
 (0.493) (0.537) (0.491) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.591 0.087 -0.076 
 (0.689) (0.726) (0.682) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion  
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.476*** -0.031 -0.324 
 (0.189) (0.189) (0.244) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table A28. 
Linear probability model – Two-stage least squares estimates with sample selection correction 
(Semykina and Wooldridge, 2006) [using initial values of the time-varying regressors as 
Mundlak terms]. Projoven sixth Public Call effects on formal employment by level of 
completion. Heterogeneous treatment over time and endogenous treatment. 
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 
12 months 
[ 2ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 18 
months 
[ 3ˆ ] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.646 -0.086 -0.260 
 (0.512) (0.554) (0.509) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.590 0.094 -0.086 
 (0.677) (0.698) (0.665) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion 
[G4] vs. [G3] 0.424** 0.016 -0.283 
 (0.174) (0.145) (0.248) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A29. 
Two-stage least squares estimates with sample selection correction (Semykina and 
Wooldridge, 2006) [without Mundlak terms]. Projoven sixth Public Call effects on monthly 
wages by level of completion. Heterogeneous treatment over time and endogenous treatment. 
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 
12 months 
[ 2ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 18 
months 
[ 3ˆ ] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.003 0.417 -0.198 
 (0.769) (0.792) (0.754) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.407 0.484 -0.340 
 (1.038) (1.095) (1.032) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion 
[G4] vs. [G3] 1.229* -0.895* -0.769 
 (0.633) (0.510) (0.608) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table A30. 
Two-stage least squares estimates with sample selection correction (Semykina and 
Wooldridge, 2006) [using initial values of the time-varying regressors as Mundlak terms]. 
Projoven sixth Public Call effects on monthly wages by level of completion. Heterogeneous 
treatment over time and endogenous treatment. 
 
Effects 
after 6 
months 
[ 1ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 
12 months 
[ 2ˆ ] 
Additional 
effects after 
18 months 
[ 3ˆ ] 
    
A. Effects of Projoven internship placement 
[G3] vs. [G2] 0.003 0.417 -0.198 
 (0.769) (0.792) (0.754) 
[G4] vs. [G2] 0.407 0.484 -0.340 
 (1.038) (1.095) (1.032) 
B. Effects of Projoven internship completion 
[G4] vs. [G3] 1.229* -0.895* -0.769 
 (0.633) (0.510) (0.608) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
[G1]: Control group (992 individuals). 
[G2]: Dropout group with only classroom training and no internship placement (183 individuals). 
[G3]: Dropout group with classroom training and internship placement (231 individuals). 
[G4]: Treatment group with the full treatment (578 individuals). 
Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Figure A1. 
Kernel densities propensity score (predicted probability of participating in the training). 
Control group and participants in Projoven sixth Public Call. 
 
 
